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Land Title Registration: An English Solution
to an American Problem
C. DENT BOSnCK*
INTRODUCTION**
Some fifty years ago, respected American legal scholars engaged in an
extended debate on the virtues and the feasibility of land title registration.,
*Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. J.D., 1958, Mercer University Law School;
B.A., 1952, Mercer University. The author acknowledges with gratitude the research assistance
of Ms. Darlene Marsh and Ms. Marcia McMurray, second year law students at Vanderbilt Law
School.
**The author wishes to thank Mrs. Maggie Richards and Mr. Stuart Bridge, Lecturers in
Law at the University of Leeds for their helpful comments on the preparation of this Article.
I. Prompted by the failure of three of the four title insurance companies operating in
New York City, the Real Estate Board of New York procured a grant from the Carnegie
Corporation to the New York Law Society which engaged Professor Richard R. Powell of
Columbia University to conduct a study of title registration. The publication of his results was
the starting point of the approximately four-year debate. See R. POWELL, REGISTRATION OF TiE
TnmE To LAND iN THE STATE OF NEw YoRK (1938).
Professor Powell was a longtime advocate of the Torrens system, a voluntary title regis-
tration system that, in its American version, relies on the use of a certificate of title to evidence
ownership of real estate. However, Powell concluded that voluntary registration could not be
made to work in New York because of the substantial costs associated with the transition from
recordation to registration. He further rejected compulsory registration with a public subsidy
of the costs because there was not a reasonable probability that title registration would operate
better than recordation. Breaking camp with the Torrens school of thought, Powell recom-
mended repeal of the registration statute and public regulation of privately-controlled title
insurance companies. Id. at 74.
The New York Law Society and the Carnegie Corporation disclaimed Powell's conclusions.
The Real Estate Board of New York entered a vigorous and unanimous dissent from the
conclusions reached. Bade, Book Review, 23 MINN. L. REv. 874, 874 (1939). Reviewers of
Powell's book were quick to take issue with his positions. Their suggestions, however, were
far from uniform.
Professor Edward S. Bade of the University of Minnesota Law School defended the system
of title registration existing in Minnesota, although he did not claim perfection, and acknowl-
edged the hope for improvement. Id. at 876. Professor William F. Walsh of the New York
University School of Law suggested supplementing the present system of recording by requiring
the owner to obtain and pay for an official abstract of title to be kept on record under a tract
index. No change in the substantive law of real property was recommended, but the accuracy
of the abstract would be guaranteed by the state. If a need for compensation would arise, the
state would utilize a fund created by a surcharge on the abstract's costs. See Walsh, Book
Review, 16 N.Y.U. L. REv. 510 (1939).
The most in-depth analysis of Powell's evidence and conclusions was that offered by
Professor Myres S. McDougal of Yale Law School and Mr. John W. Brabner-Smith, former
Special Assistant to the U.S. Attorney General. See McDougal & Brabner-Smith, Land Title
Transfer: A Regression, 48 YALE L.J. 1125 (1939). Initially, these writers concede that the
success of voluntary registration is unlikely in light of the costs of initial registration and the
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The subject was not one that might be expected to rivet the attention of the
academic legal community, let alone that of the profession at large. Beyond
the legal profession, there was probably no awareness of this scholarly debate
among the American public. Yet this professorial exchange centered on a
subject of substantial national importance. It is not an overstatement to
suggest that problems relating to matters of title assurance have affected
directly the pocketbook of every American who has bought or sold land in
this century. Any practitioner who has had to explain to a client the aston-
ishingly high "closing costs" related to title search and title insurance, and
any client who has had to pay these costs, is painfully aware of the short-
comings of title assurance under the existing American practice.
2
opposition by the vested interests of title insurance companies and attorneys. Id. at 1140, 1147.
However, they suggest that foreign experience cannot be discounted easily, and they propose
either compulsory registration or public subsidy of voluntary registration with lowered transition
costs creating an irresistible attraction to the new system. Id. at 1149-50.
In response to the critical reviews of Powell's book, Bordwell notes, in a very conciliatory
mood, that registration appears unsuitable for the multiple common law estates, yet revision
of substantive property law seems undesirable. See Bordwell, The Resurrection of Registration
of Title, 7 U. Cm. L. REv. 470 (1940). Further, Bordwell assumes a middle-of-the-road position
with regard to the relevance of foreign experiments. The secrecy of conveyancing under the
English system (with resulting restraints on alienation) is contrasted with public transfers, ab
initio, in the United States (corresponding with freer alienability). However, the difference
pointed out is not used to discount foreign experiments, but only to require a stronger case
for registration in America. Id. at 479. Land liquidity is attributed primarily to the condition
of the market, rather than the system of transfer. Id. at 483. The position taken with respect
to whether registration should be voluntary or compulsory was merely to state that a compulsory
system must be accompanied by a public subsidy. Id. at 488. In conclusion, Bordwell rec-
ommends switching from alphabetical grantor-grantee indexes to tract indexes and creating a
comprehensive action to quiet title. His reasoning is that this should be attempted before
adopting the more revolutionary Torrens system, because the tendency to look at foreign models
is not always desirable. Id. at 479, 483, 488.
McDougal's final chapter is written in response to Bordwell's article. McDougal concludes
that, in fact, Bordwell strongly favors title registration since he recommends all of the important
administrative features of a registration system. Further, he intimates that abolishing concurrent
and future interests would be acceptable. McDougal, Title Registration and Land Law Reform:
A Reply, 8 U. Cm. L. Rav. 63, 64, 74 (1940).
2. In many respects, the shortcomings of the American title assurance system reflect a
broad acceptance of the notions Professor Powell advanced five decades ago, and the failure
of those charged with developing our system to move to the ideas of Professor McDougal.
Powell's justifications for the conclusions and suggestions of his study were as follows. First,
difficulties of administration result from the level of incompetence and the political nature of
American public officials entrusted with implementing title registration. Second, America's
success in adopting a registration system is unrelated to other countries' experiences with similar
systems. This dissimilarity is due to several factors:
a. the dictatorial nature of foreign governments, under which registration has been suc-
cessful, as contrasted to American democracy;
b. the absence of an existing recordation system in some foreign jurisdictions which would
be replaced by registration (American adoption would displace existing recordation statutes);
c. the necessity for an initial judicial proceeding to accomplish registration resulting from
[Vol. 63:55
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This Article critiques methods of assuring real estate titles in the United
States today and encourages fresh interest in a better. approach. The Article
arises from the belief that current practices in all American jurisdictions are
wasteful, unreasonably expensive, archaic, and worst of all, uncertain to
achieve that which they purportedly intend to accomplish: certainty in land
ownership. After examining a portion of Great Britain's recent experience
in dealing with the problems of land transfer and title assurance, this Article
will consider the feasibility of adapting elements of the British scheme to
an American context. 3
U.S. constitutional requirements of due process and separation of powers;
d. the differential in skill and honesty between American and European public officials;
e. the unwillingness of Americans to accept an inconclusive certificate of title as contrasted
with the ease of satisfying foreign land owners; and
f. the complexities of the substantive American law of real property (primarily the existence
of concurrent and future interests) compared to the relative simplicity of European property
law. See R. PowEL, supra note 1, at 56-60.
McDougal's response to Powell's specific justifications seem well taken. With respect to
the competency and trustworthiness of American public officials, it is pointed out that Powell
presents no evidence of corruption and little evidence of incompetence. Further, the general
growth of assurance funds discredits corrupt or incompetent public officials. As regards the
relevance of foreign experience, arguing in a reductio ad absurdum style, it is shown:
a. that many foreign experimenters are not, in fact, dictatorships;
b. that only a small number of foreign jurisdictions did not replace an existing recordation
system;
c. that it is constitutionally possible to eliminate an initial judicial proceeding by registering
only possessory title which would not become absolute until the expiration of a limitations
period;
d. that there is a lack of evidence on corrupt practices by, and incompetency of, American
public officials;
e. that American landowners have accepted the inconclusiveness of the recordation system,
much of which would become more certain under registration; and
f. that only a small part of American land is encumbered by future interests, which can
be accommodated by a Torrens system in any event. McDougal & Brabner-Smith, supra note
1, at 1133-36, 1138-43.
An especially vitriolic attack is mounted on Powell's cost comparisons between title
insurance and registration. Additionally, Powell's suggestions are criticized for the extra costs
associated with regulation of title insurers. Finally, the focus on the controversy is shifted from
comparative costs to comparative protections, with the conceded superiority of the latter under
a registration system acknowledged by all writers. See id. See also Fairchild & Springer, A
Criticism of Professor Richard R. Powell's Book Entitled Registration of Title to Land in the
State of New York, 24 CoiRELL L. Rav. 557 (1939).
3. The legislation of 1925, analyzed herein, applies only to England and Wales. This Article
addresses the Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 20, § 209(3); the Land Registration
Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 21, § 148(3); the Settled Land Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch.
18, § 120(3); and, the Land Charges Act, 1972, ch. 61, § 19(3).
Some years ago, Professor John E. Cribbet of the University of Illinois Law School
undertook an interesting comparative analysis of Scandinavian property law, with primary
emphasis on adaptations of land-use planning methods for use in America. He notes the success
of title registraion, similar to a Torrens system, and the absence of commercial title insurance.
Real estate agents frequently handle entire transactions of land transfer due to the simplicity
of the system. Cribbet, Some Reflections on the Law of Land-A View From Scandinavia, 62
1987]
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It is surely one of the curiosities of the late twentieth century that broad
segments of English law, developed from the middle ages to the nineteenth
century, survive in the United States more or less intact while the nation in
which this law principally evolved long since has abandoned its most archaic
and non-functional features. 4 One has only to see the smile of puzzled
bemusement on the face of a British professor at the suggestion that the
Rule in Shelley's Case may well be operative in half a dozen American
states5 to gauge the contemporary gap between our law and the British
structure from which it was derived. Add to this oddity some attempt to
explain the workings of the American recordation system with its amazing
cost and duplication and the English lawyer's disbelief grows, especially since
few English lawyers today recall their own archaic practices before the
enactments of the modern legislation. How can it be, they may well ask,
that a society whose science has conquered the moon is preoccupied with
such irrelevances in an important sector of its jurisprudence? How indeed?
Yet these cobwebs continue to plague our realty practice. These enduring
anachronisms, ever more expensive to indulge, may gratify the ghosts of
those ancient conveyancers who devised them, and their survival may warm
the heart of the dedicated teacher of future interests. It is less likely, however,
that anyone else will be persuaded as to the merits of this practice.
Nw. U.L. R~v. 277, 282 (1967).
In suggesting a program of reform adapted from the above legislation, the author has
profited from the opportunity of a sabbatical year in England to see firsthand something of
the modern British system as it pertains in England and Wales.
4. England abolished the Rule in Shelley's Case in the Law of Property (Amendment)
Act, 1924, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 5, sched. 10; the Doctrine of Destructibility of Contingent
Remainders in the Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 20, § 131; and the Doctrine
of Worthier Title in the Real Property Limitations Act, 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4, ch. 106, § 3.
Conversely, in America, the Rule in Shelley's Case survives in Nevada, Utah and Wyoming.
Also the Doctrine of Destructibility of Contingent Remainders may survive in Florida, Oregon,
Pennsylvania and Tennessee, and the Doctrine of Worthier Title, as modified, continues in
many jurisdictions. See infra note 5.
5. Most states have abolished the Rule in Shelley's Case by statute or judicial decision,
but the rule survives in some states. The Rule has not been modified statutorily in six states:
Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Indiana, North Carolina, and Texas. In three states-Nevada,
Utah, and Wyoming-neither the legislature nor the courts have addressed the issue. L. SIMEs
& A. SisrrH, THE LAW OF FTruRE INTERESTS § 1563 (1956 & Supp. 1985).
Two other early common-law rules survive to some extent in American jurisdictions. The
Doctrine of Worthier Title (Conveyor-Heir Rule), a rule at common law, continues to have
force in many jurisdictions but is now generally considered to be a rule of construction. Id.
§§ 1603, 1605. In a few states, however, the Doctrine has been abolished by statute. L. SIM.S,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FuTURE INTERESTS 64 (1966). The Doctrine of Destructibility of
Contingent Remainders apparently has viability in four American jurisdictions-Florida, Ore-
gon, Pennsylvania and Tennessee. See J. RrrcmaE, N. ALFORD, JR. & R. EFFLAND, DECEDENTS'
ESTATES AND TRUsTS 849 n.9 (6th ed. 1982).
Difficulties arise in stating with certainty in which states the various rules actually survive.
Some statutes have been inexact in attempting to abolish the various rules, and states may refer
to wills, deeds, or both.
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The British effort at reforming conveyancing law was, like the comparable
American experience, a patchwork of abolition and modification for many
years. 6 The hit and miss approach was perhaps even more understandable
in America given the numerous jurisdictions and the constitutional limitations
involved. It was not until the 1880's that the work of the British began to
take on the character of a comprehensive and pervasive change. 7
By 1925, reform reached full flower in the final enactment of the four
property statutes considered by this Article.' This extraordinary legislation,
which swept away much of the flotsam that had so long clogged the law of
6. The earliest reform prevented the creation of new tenures. This was accomplished by
the Statute Quia Emptores, 1290, 18 Edw. 1, ch. I & 2, which prohibited further alienation
by subinfeudation. The Statute of Uses, 1535, 27 Hen. 8, ch. 10, resulted in vast changes in
the law of real estate, including conveyancing. The next step was the conversion of all free
tenures into free and common socage (the forerunner of the freehold) and the abolition of
practically all of the burdensome incidents. See Tenures Abolition Act, 1660, 12 Car. 2, ch.
24. Subsequent to this legislation, only two tenures survived: freehold and copyhold. Copyhold
was an unfree tenure peculiar to manors in that transfer could only be effected through a
proceeding in the manor court.
The traditional method of investigating past transactions evidenced by the deeds was utilized
for the transfer of freeholds. Provision was made for voluntary conversion of copyholds into
freeholds. Copyhold Act, 1841, 4 & 5 Vict., ch. 35; Copyhold Act, 1843, 6 & 7 Vict., ch. 23;
Copyhold Act, 1844, 7 & 8 Vict., ch. 55. Compulsory conversion soon followed. See Copyhold
Act, 1852, 15 & 16 Vict., ch. 51; Copyhold Act, 1858, 21 & 22 Vict., ch. 94; Copyhold Act,
1887, 50 & 51 Vict., ch. 73 (current version at Copyhold Act, 1894, 57 & 58 Vict., ch. 46).
While the conversion of copyhold into freehold proceeded, England first attempted title
registration on a voluntary basis and few registrations occurred. Land Registry Act, 1862, 25
& 26 Vict., ch. 53; Land Transfer Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vict., ch. 87. Finally, all copyholds were
transformed into freeholds by the Law of Property Act, 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5, ch. 16, § 128,
sched. 12, (0.
In spite of these reforms, English realty is still subject to feudal tenurial ownership rather
than American allodial ownership. All land is still owned by the sovereign and held of him or
of some lord by a tenant in fee simple. Practically though, the effect is the same as the American
fee simple absolute. See R.. MEGARRY & H. WADE, THE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY 9, 25, 28-38,
195-96 (5th ed. 1984). For further reforms regarding the abolition of rules limiting future
interests, see supra note 4.
7. The Settled Land Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict., ch. 38, quickened the process by granting
equitable owners of limited interests (such as life tenants or tenants in tail) statutory powers
of sale, even though the legal estate was vested in another. See J. RiDDALL, INTRODUCTION TO
LAND LAW 96, 123 (3rd ed. 1983).
Following a bitter dispute between the Liberal Party, led by Lord Chancellor Halsbury,
and the solicitors, acting through the Law Society, a compromise was reached on compulsory
title registration. The Land Transfer Act, 1897, 60 & 61 Vict., ch. 65, provided for compulsory
registration in the County of London, but conceded a County Veto to the solicitors. The Veto
prevented extension of the area under compulsory registration, unless initiated by a county or
urban district council. See Offer, The Origins of the Law of Property Acts, 1910-25, 40 MOD.
L. REv. 505, 506 (1977).
8. Six statutes were enacted in the 1925 reform. This Article focuses on the Law of
Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 20; the Land Registration Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo.
5, ch. 21; the Settled Land Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 18; and the Land Charges Act,
1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 22, amended by the Land Charges Act, 1972, ch. 61. The remaining
two statutes are the Trustee Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 19, and the Administration of
Estates Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 23.
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property, has reached mature years from which its effectiveness can be
measured. The legislation is far from a perfect answer to all contemporary
needs, yet by any standard, it has been a remarkable advance over the old
English practice.9 Surprisingly little litigation and, indeed, widespread ac-
ceptance of the basic principles of the legislation have resulted. 0 From time
to time Parliamentary Reform Commissions have convened to consider change,
but most of their recommendations have amounted to little more than
tinkering or fine tuning of the basics." The structure remains solidly rooted
in the original legislation.
Despite this acceptance, flaws exist,' 2 and some of them are quite serious.
Furthermore, some flaws are growing more serious due to modern societal
concerns. These defects are clearly visible through the Irism of sixty years
experience and will receive special attention here. This Article proposes that
despite the deficiencies in the English title assurance system, the present
American title assurance system can be improved by adopting some of the
successful features of the British system, especially features of the Land
Registration Act of 1925.
I. THE GoAL OF TITLE ASSURANCE SYSTEMS
Before moving to a review of current American practice, it is appropriate
to consider what an ideal title assurance plan should involve. The philosophy
of an ideal system is that it provides, as conclusive title binding all the
world, a state-guaranteed registration evidenced by a certificate which reflects
the exact state of the title at any moment in time. The ideal system substitutes
registration for any inquiry into actual or constructive notice of facts about
ownership. Presently, inquiry is concerned with evidence of title obtained
through recordations, actual notice, or possession. Under the ideal system,
9. British commentary on the effectiveness of the legislation acknowledges the need for
further refinement, but also hails its success as a tremendous human intellectual accomplishment,
fully justifying the long and heavy preparation. In forty years of operation, only one amendment
of any substance has been made. R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, supra note 6, at 1150; J. RmDALL,
supra note 7, at 459-60.
10. R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, supra note 6, at 1151.
11. The one substantive change made by the Law of Property Act, 1969, ch. 59, was to
provide a claim against the compensation fund for persons whose losses result from undiscov-
erable registered land charges. Law of Property Act, 1969, ch. 59, §" 25. The charge must not
be registered against the name of a person who was a party to the transaction or against a
person whose name appeared on the relevant documents of title. In addition, the claimant must
be without actual notice. See J. RIDDALL, supra note 7, at 414.
12. Commentators have pointed out, inter alia, defects arising from the fact that land
charges are registerable against the names of the landholders, defects arising from a failure to
abolish the creation of new interests in fee tail, and defects arising from a failure to provide
adequately for the matrimonial home. See, e.g., K. GRAY & P. SYmEs, REAL PROPERTY AND
REAL PEOPLE, PRrNciPI's OF LAND LAW 353-76 (1981); R. MEGARRY & H. WNADE, supra note
6, at 1151-53; J. RIDDALL, supra note 7, at 459-60.
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however, inquiry is solely a matter of whether there is a registration and
what that registration contains.
The registration scheme must be so comprehensive as to provide procedures
for handling every kind of interest possible: legal estates, marital rights,
bankruptcy claims of every kind, and all equitable interests. It must be
possible to register any legitimate interest or claim, so that the moving
question is whether the claim is or is not registered. If the claim is properly
registered, it is effective; if it is not registered, it is ineffective. The com-
pensation fund, mentioned below, must resolve matters of fraud, error, and
mistake.
The ideal plan should reduce drastically the number and complexity of
interests that concern the person undertaking to establish title. At present,
the myriad of possible legal estates and the details of all equitable interests
bearing on the land are of primary importance to the conveyancer and his
purchaser because they all bear directly on a successful assurance of title. 3
The methods by which the English reduced the number of possible legal
estates, converted the rest to equitable estates, provided for overriding many
equitable estates so that they need not burden the purchaser, and limited
concurrent estates are discussed below. These features are an essential cor-
ollary to a successful registration scheme.
Once the number of relevant interests is reduced, the registration system
will function so that one registration card, clearly and simply arranged, will
mirror exactly the state of a title at any given moment. In addition, the
card must be consistent and totally accessible, quickly and inexpensively
amendable to reflect current change, and absolutely binding on all parties.14
Administrative procedures, not a full scale judicial hearing, should accom-
plish the initial registration. Ideally, public revenues should support regis-
tration costs." The title should be state-guaranteed and backed by sufficient
financial resources to compensate adequately those who are innocent, yet
suffer losses because of fraud, error, or the mistakes of others. The process
13. See Payne, In Search of Title, 14 ALA. L. REv. 11, 11-12 (1962) (indicating that problems
in conveyancing can arise based on the various interests parties may hold in the land).
14. Even in an ideal system, compelling values can exist that require diminished certainty
in the registration system. These compelling values should be weighed carefully. One area in
particular that has caused such concern in England is that of an implied trust in the case of
the marital home. See infra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
15. One difficulty with title registration is that the costs become higher as the degree of
certainty of title increases. See 6A R. POwELL & P. RoHAN, PowELL ON REAL PROPERTY
908[3] (1986).
Powell suggests that the expense of title registration could be decreased by "establish[ing]
a system of compulsory registration of 'possessory title,' as was adopted in England." Id. This
system would reduce detailed searching of previous conveyances. He also advocates combining
compulsory registration "with a ten-year statute of limitations, which would permit the reg-
istration of possessory title to become transformed into a registration of ownership, by ...
presentation of evidence of continuous possession for ... ten years." Id.
19871
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should rest on a system of tract identification, rather than on the ambiguities
and vagaries of a name index. Those administering the system should be
highly trained, competent professionals. Registration procedures, once estab-
lished, should prove relatively cheap to maintain and administer.
The successful system is one that is simple, accessible, inexpensive to
administer once in place, and above all reliable. It is the premise of this
Article that the current American system is none of these.
II. CURRENT AMEICAN PRACTICE
A rural Georgia lawyer who began his practice during the depression once
told the author, "Son, I never began searching a title unless I was starving
to death, and I never finished one without wishing I had." That remark is
understandable when one considers the modern American methods of title
assurance, unchanged in their basics since before the 1930's.
Each of the American jurisdictions has a somewhat different system, often
with significant variations. Although the theme is fundamentally the same
and centers inevitably on a system of recordation of the evidence of title,
as opposed to a recordation of the title itself, 16 how, where, and by whom
these records are kept varies considerably among the states. The practice of
examiners in reviewing either the original records, or an abstract of them
prepared by someone else, also varies. Nevertheless, all methods have the
goal of producing a certificate of opinion prepared by a competent profes-
sional, ordinarily an attorney, accurately assessing the state of the title at
the moment of transfer. The evidence of the records and of certain extrinsic
matters, such as actual possession, serve as the basis for the certificate in
most cases.'
7
Because such a certificate hinges on the professional competence of the
certifier, and therefore on the ability of the examiner to make good any
deficiencies in certification, a supplementary assurance for the purchaser has
developed in the form of title insurance. Title insurance undertakes to insure
the purchaser against those defects enumerated in the policy and supposedly
provides a back-up compensation for certification errors. For this transfer
of risk, the insurer charges a substantial premium ordinarily linked to the
purchase price of the property. 8
16. Id. 908[2].
17. Id. 909[5].
18. For example, Chicago Title Insurance Company publishes rates for owner's policies and
mortgage policies. Except for the four major metropolitan areas, the rates in Tennessee are as
follows:
[Vol. 63:55
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As an additional back-up, many deeds contain warranties. Warranties are
contractual guarantees by the transferor about the state of the title. 9 This
technique is the oldest of the types of protection offered today and is certainly
the least effective because of the drastic limitations on the amounts recover-
able, limitations on the identity of those who can be pursued, and the lack
of standard meaning for the phrases used to construct the warranties. 20
Policy Premium
Original Owner's Title Insurance Policy (per thousand
dollars of coverage)
Up to $100,000 of liability written $3.50
Over $100,000 and up to $5,000,000, add $2.00
Policy Premium
Original First Mortgage Title Policy (per thousand
dollars of coverage)
Up to $100,000 of liability written $2.50
Over $100,000 and up to $500,000, add $1.75
Over $500,000 and up to $10,000,000, add $1.50
CHICAGO TITLE INS. Co., RATE CARD (effective Feb. 19, 1987).
The company has a minimum fee plus additional charges for a title search and examination.
If one purchases both an owner's policy and a mortgage policy, the fee is the larger of the
two policies plus $35. Id.
19. Three basic types of deeds are employed to convey property in the United States. These
are the general warranty deed, the special warranty deed, and the quit claim deed. The general
warranty deed generally indicates to the purchaser that the title is not defective and usually
contains six covenants of title-the covenant of seisin, the covenant of the right to convey,
the covenant against encumbrances, the covenant of quiet enjoyment, the covenant of warranty,
and the covenant of further assurances. The grantor warrants that the title is free from any
defects. J. BRUCE, J. ELY, JR. & C. BOSTICK, MODERN PROPERTY LAW 695-96 (1984).
A special warranty deed contains the same covenants as a general warranty deed. This deed,
however, does not provide as much protection to the grantee because the grantor warrants only
that he did not cause any defects in title. He does not warrant against any and all title defects.
The least measure of protection to a grantee is found in the quit claim deed. This deed contains
no covenants and the grantor conveys only the interest he holds in the property. Id.
20. Different jurisdictions attach various interpretations to the covenants of title. For ex-
ample, in a majority of American jurisdictions, the covenant of seisin indicates ownership of
the land, but in a few states this covenant attests only to "the grantor's possession of the
conveyed land." 6A R. POWELL & P. RoHAN, supra note 15, 986. See, e.g., Simpson v.
Johnson, 100 Idaho 357, 361-62, 597 P.2d 600, 604-05 (1979) (finding that grantees were entitled
to relief when grantors did not have legal title to all of the property described in a warranty
deed containing a covenant of seisin); Brown v. Lober, 75 Ill.2d 547, 550-51, 389 N.E.2d 1188,
1190-91 (1979) (citing the Illinois statute which states that a grantor covenants to a grantee
that he is "lawfully seized of an indefeasible estate in fee simple" when he makes and delivers
the deed to the grantee, and emphasizing that a covenant of seisin "assure[s] the grantee that
the grantor is . . . lawfully seized and has the power to convey . . . [that] which he professes
to convey"). But see Baughman v. Hower, 56 Ohio App. 162, 168, 10 N.E.2d 176, 179 (1937)
(stating that if "the original grantor . . . was not in possession at the time of the deed to [the
grantor] . . . there [is] an immediate eviction," and quoting Wetzel v. Richcreek, 53 Ohio St.
62, 70, 40 N.E. 1004, 1006 (1885), that "[i]t has long been the law of this state that a covenant
of seisin is not broken . . . if the covenantor has the actual seisin, though not the legal title,
at the time of the conveyance").
The covenant of warranty "can be either all-inclusive or specifically restricted in its scope."
6A R. POWELL & P. Roar.A, supra note 15, 899 (footnotes omitted). An all-inclusive, or
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Finally, in some states a system of registration based on the "Torrens
system" exists alongside the recordation system.2' This system seemed to
hold bright promise in the early days of this century, but has failed to take
hold in any American jurisdiction for reasons particularly pertinent to this
Article's proposals.22
The American title assurance plan is, then, one of patchwork. Various
elements of it evolved centuries ago. Some features of it arose only in this
century. Due to various reasons-the problems of multiple jurisdictions,
lawyers' vested interests in the current system and their resistance to change,
perceived constitutional problems, title insurance company opposition,2 and
the peculiar sanctity always accorded to land ownership and the law sur-
rounding it-a systematic, pervasive scheme of reform has never evolved in
the United States. The following sections turn to a more detailed consid-
eration of the present system and its shortcomings.
A. Deed Warranties
The development of the oldest extant variety of title protection can be
attributed to the genius of the 17th century conveyancer Sir Orlando Bridg-
man. 24 Sir Orlando and others who developed the idea of deed warranties
apparently felt that a transferor of realty would be less likely to convey a
general warranty, usually indicates that a grantor, his heirs, and his personal representatives
warrant the property against any future claims or demands made by anyone on the grantee,
his heirs, personal representatives and assigns. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:4-7 (West 1940);
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 253(5) (McKinney 1968); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-68 (1986). In contrast,
special warranty covenants restrict a grantor's warrant to claims and demands of the grantor
or those claiming through or under him. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-305 (1986); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 183, § 17 (West 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:4-8 (West 1940); VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-69 (1986).
21. The Torrens system originated in 1858 with Sir Robert Torrens, Register General of the
Province of South Australia. He was associated with the shipping industry and drew upon that
experience in drafting the first law for title registration. His objective was to make the transfer
of title to land as simple and easy as the transfer of title to a vessel or an automobile. A.
CASNER & W. LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 918 (2d ed. 1969); J. CRIBur, PRINCIPLES
OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 230 (1962).
22. See infra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
23. See Johnstone, Title Insurance, 66 YALE L.J. 492, 513 (1957) (asserting that title
insurance companies oppose the Torrens registration system because it threatens their "economic
lives").
24. Lord Bridgman is generally known as "the father of modern conveyances." 6 W.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 605 (1924). Lord Bridgman apparently assisted
many of his royal friends in the area of conveyancing. Id. One of his most noted clients was
the Duke of Norfolk, from whose case the foundations for the Rule Against Perpetuities
evolved. See A. CASNER & W. LEACH, supra note 21, at 356 n.14. Another of Lord Bridgman's
contributions to the law of property was his "creation of an intermediate estate in trustees to
preserve contingent remainders .... " Id. at 356 (emphasis in original).
Lord Bridgman held several important posts in the English legal system. His most prominent
position was that of Lord Keeper from 1667-72, an appointment that occurred from a lucky
accident according to Holdsworth. Prior to this appointment, Lord Bridgman served as Chief
Baron of Exchequer and then as Chief Justice of the Common Pleas which apparently was his
most heralded position. See 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra, at 537-38.
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defective title if certain guarantees of a contractual nature accompanied a
deed. Accordingly, they began the practice of inserting into some deeds a
contractual promise from the grantor about the title, and commitments from
the grantor on what measures would be taken to protect the grant if specified
deficiencies arose. Eventually some six variations developed,2 often over-
lapping and variably construed by those dealing with them. Indeed, one of
the shortcomings -of deed warranties has been the lack of standard forms
of expression. The eighteenth century Statute of Anne26 provided some relief
by decreeing that certain usages in deeds would be construed to contain
certain warranties. That statute became the model for numerous American
attempts to achieve the same end. Even now, however, lack of standard
usage and meanings remains a problem. 27
Other and equally severe difficulties limit the function of deed warranties.
The question of the time at which breach of warranty occurs is fundamental.2
25. See supra note 19. The covenant of seisin generally assures a grantee that the grantor
is legally seized of the property. A minority of jurisdictions hold that the covenant of seisin
only warrants that the grantor has possession of the land, not that he has legal title. See 6A
R. POWELL & P. RoHAN, supra note 15, 896.
The covenant of the right to convey is similar to the covenant of seisin but provides additional
protection to grantees because under this covenant the grantor warrants that he has the legal
right to convey the land. This covenant becomes important in jurisdictions that regard the
covenant of seisin as assuring only that the grantor has possession of the property. Also, when
a grantor holds legal title to the property but a third party is in adverse possession of the land,
this covenant protects the grantee. Id. 897.
The covenant against encumbrances warrants that the property is free of encumbrances such
as mortgages, liens, and easements that are not known to the grantee. If the grantor breaches
this covenant, the grantee can recover damages. Recovery, however, is nominal unless the
breach "impairs the beneficial use and enjoyment of the premises." Id. 898.
These three covenants are present covenants that are breached, if at all, on delivery of the
deed. The three covenants discussed below are future covenants that are breached "only if the
grantee is evicted from the property. The statute of limitations begins to run at the time of
the breach in each case." J. BRUCE, J. ELY, JR. & C. BOSTICK, supra note 19, at 695.
The covenant of warranty protects a grantee against losses occurring "by virtue of a failure
of the title which the deed purports to convey." 6A R. POWELL & P. RotA , supra note 15,
899. Today this covenant and the covenant of quiet enjoyment are essentially the same. Id.
900. The covenant of further assurances requires the grantor and his heirs to do whatever
is necessary to make the grantee's title good. Id. 901.
26. Statute of Anne, 6 Anne, ch. 35, § 30 (1707).
27. See supra note 20.
28. The covenant of seisin, in a majority of American jurisdictions, warrants that the
grantor legally owns the property. See supra note 25. A minority of states, however, hold that
this covenant relates only to the grantor's possession of the land. Thus, differences can arise
concerning breach of this covenant.
Under the ownership concept, breach occurs when the grantor purports to convey a greater
estate, in quantity or quality, than he actually owns. See 6A R. POWELL & P. RoILAN, supra
note 15, 896. See also Russell v. Belsher, 221 Ala. 360, 361, 128 So. 452, 453 (1930)
(emphasizing "that a covenant of seisin is broken as soon as made, if the covenantor had no
title to the estates granted"); accord Rainey v. Davidson, 224 Mo. App. 679, 26 S.W.2d 841
(1930); Rhodes v. Johnson, 32 Tenn. App. 127, 222 S.W.2d 38 (1949).
In the possession states, breach of the covenant of seisin occurs when the grantor does not
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Different theories lead to dramatically different results on whether the cov-
enants relate to "possessory" rights or to "ownership" rights. 29
Perhaps the most difficult question is whether a covenant "runs with the
land." The answer determines ultimately who can sue whom in the chain
of title. 30 Once a breach of a covenant has occurred, it is presumably
converted to a chose in action, and controversy arises over the manner in
which one must assign such a right. 31
Finally, the entire question of damages permeates the covenant usage.
Even if the party finally injured can travel up the chain of warrantors until
a solvent and available party to respond to damages is found, the maximum
amount recoverable is drastically limited. Seldom will the recovery be ade-
quate to cover the loss. 32
have possession of the property. See, e.g., Baughman, 56 Ohio App. at 168, 10 N.E.2d at 179
(holding that if a grantor is "not in possession, there [is] an immediate eviction"). See also
Wetzel, 53 Ohio St. at 70, 40 N.E. at 1006 (stating that "if the covenantor had the actual
seisin, though not the legal title, ... and the [covenantee] is put in possession" then the
covenant of seisin has not been breached "until there has been an eviction under a paramount
title").
Although present covenants generally are breached on delivery of the deed, and future
covenants are breached at a later date when the grantee suffers an eviction, some states have
enacted statutes so that the "present" covenants run with the land and can be breached at a
date after delivery of the deed. For example, in Colorado, "[c]ovenants of seisin, peaceable
possession, freedom from encumbrances, and warranty contained in any conveyance of real
estate ... shall run with the premises and inure to the benefit of all subsequent purchasers
and encumbrancers." CoLo. Rav. STAT. § 38-30-121 (1973).
Similarly, in Georgia:
The purchaser of lands obtains with the title ... all the rights which any former
owner . . . under whom he claims may have had by virtue of any covenants of
... freedom from encumbrances contained in the conveyance from any former
grantor unless the transmission of such covenants with the land is expressly
prohibited in the covenant itself.
GA. CODE ANN. § 44-5-60 (1982). Finally, in New York, "[iln an action based upon breach
of a covenant of seisin or against incumbrances, the time within which the action must be
commenced shall be computed form an eviction." N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 206(c) (McKinney
1972).
29. See supra note 20.
30. See 6A R. POWELL & P. RosAt, supra note 15, 902 (indicating that the modern view
is that future covenants run with the land). See also J. CIUBBET, supra note 21, at 209 (stating
that some American jurisdictions also permit "present covenants to run with the land").
31. See J. CRBBET, supra note 21, at 209 (asserting that traditionally a later grantee could
not sue an original grantor for breach of a present covenant of title because once one of these
covenants was breached it became a chose in action which was non-assignable, and noting that
some American courts, however, "abandoned this 'technical scruple' "so that present covenants
could run with the land and a remote grantee would have an action against an original grantor
if the covenant were breached).
32. If the title proves defective it may not be discovered for many years and, by this time:
the land may have increased greatly in value and major improvements may have
been added .... is the damage to be determined by the actual loss suffered at
the future eviction or will it be restricted to the purchase money paid to the war-
rantor? A small minority of states . .. have followed the former rule and thus
given the warrantee the maximum protection under the future covenants. The over-
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Deed warranties do not purport Lo be, nor could they be, sufficient
protection in the modem land transaction. They are, at best, auxiliaries in
the search for proper title assurance. Worst of all, deed warranties are
survivors of a simpler age, and are of little utility today.
B. The Recordation System
The recordation system is the center of modern American title assurance.
It is the link on which all else depends. The system has ancient roots on
this side of the Atlantic, existing in some form since long before the Rev-
olution.33 Interestingly, no comparable system evolved in England. Various
reasons have been advanced for its absence there and its development here.3 4
The vast stretches of available land, less likely to be visibly occupied by the
owner, must have played a part in the perceived need for an alternative
method of putting purchasers on notice of claims. The statutes were by no
means uniform in their development and have resulted in four recognized
forms.
31
whelming majority of states have felt this placed too great a burden on the warrantor
... and have restricted recovery to the purchase price, or a proportionate share
thereof for partial breach, plus interest.
J. CRraIBr, supra note 21, at 212 (footnotes omitted).
33. See 6A R. PowELL & P. RoaAN, supra note 15, 90411] (discussing the origination of
recording systems in colonial America); 4 Am. LAw OF PROP. § 17.4 (1952) (setting forth the
history of American recording acts and stating that "[t]he earliest mention of the record of a
deed in the United States is found in the records of the Plymouth Colony in 1627").
34. Prior to the Statue of Enrollments, 27 Hen. 8, ch. 16 (1535), no system of recording
land titles existed in England. This statute was part of a plan to record or register land
conveyances. It met, however, with opposition from the landed aristocracy who did not want
to make their affairs known to the public. Thus, conveyancers devised a scheme to circumvent
the statute. See 1 R. PATTON, PATTON ON LAND Trras § 3 (1957).
In 1845, Parliament passed the Real Property Act which made it possible to convey land
by a simple deed and to avoid the schemes developed by early conveyancers. Id. Even today,
"proof of title in England is... by possession of the property and by exhibition of the original
title deeds" except in limited areas affected by a registration system. Id. § 6.
In contrast, a recording system developed quite early in American history. See supra note
33 and accompanying text. Proof of title in the United States comes primarily from public
records. Perhaps one reason for the rapid and widespread growth of recordation in the United
States is that a much larger expanse of land is involved than in England, and that a more
efficient system is needed to determine who had title to land. See I R. PATTON, supra, § 6;
6A R. Powaa & P. RoEaL, supra note 15, 90411].
35. The four types of recording statutes are the following:
a. Race-The grantee who records first prevails over any other grantees from a common
grantor. Even if the grantee who records first took the property with notice of a conveyance
to a prior grantee who did not record, the statute protects the first grantee to record.
b. Period of grace-The first grantee receives protection under the statute for a set period
of time. If he does not record by the end of that time, he is no longer protected, and a
subsequent grantee who records will prevail in a contest over ownership of the land. The use
of this type of recording statute has declined over time.
c. Race-notice-A subsequent purchaser who takes without notice and records first is
1987]
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The extent to which the records bind, the modes of record keeping, and
the overall quality of the system vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
As to the latter, even within the states themselves, variation occurs, especially
from rural to urban areas. The systems, however, are similar in the following
respects: most records are indexed on a name basis rather than a tract basis;3 6
all anticipate their use as the vehicle for establishing a "chain of title" over
some period of time;37 all purport to contain "evidence" of title rather than
title itself;3" and all in theory should contain within their bounds most of
the "evidence" of title needed to make a basic judgment as to the validity
of the title.39 If one cannot find the appropriate chain of title and the related
transactions, the title is of course defective. Remember, however, that not
every fact bearing on title is recordable. Nor must every factor bearing on
title be recorded to have effect against purchasers. 40 Typically an instrument
does not require recordation to be effective between the parties to it.4 1
The records that constitute notice under the recording system are them-
selves widely scattered. Usually they are county-based. If the land is spread
over several counties, a search of the records of each county is required.
Pertinent records may be found in a county clerk's office, in a Federal
Building, in a City Hall, in a zoning office, in state and federal environmental
offices, and throughout the records of courts of all jurisdictions. The pos-
protected by the statute.
d. Notice-This type of recording statute protects a subsequent purchaser who takes the
property without notice. The statute covers a later grantee even if a prior grantee records after
the conveyance to the subsequent purchaser and before the subsequent purchaser records, if
he records at all. J. CRMBET, supra note 21, at 220-21.
36. Id. at 216-17.
37. Id. at 224.
38. Id. at 218.
39. 4 AM. LAW OF PROP., supra note 33, § 17.34.
40. One unrecorded factor that can affect a purchaser's title is adverse possession. The
recording system does not protect a purchaser against a party who has acquired the property
by adverse possession. See, e.g., Mack v. Luebben, 215 Neb. 832, 835, 341 N.W.2d 335, 337-
38 (1983) (stating that "[a]fter the running of the statute an adverse possessor has an indefeasible
title which can only be divested by his conveyance of the land to another, or by a subsequent
disseisin for the statutory period"); West v. Tilley, 306 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1970) (finding that
adverse possession by defendant for longer than the statutorily required time entitled her to
title to land purchased by plaintiff).
Other matters affecting the validity of one's title and not disclosed by the recording system
include:
forgeries and other frauds; matters of heirship, marriage and divorce; ... re-
corders' errors; infancy, insanity, and other disabilities; ... validity of mortgage
foreclosures and of judgments and decrees; delivery of instruments; ... existence
of unprobated wills, pretermitted heirs, and posthumous children; falsity of af-
fidavits; ... parol partitions and dedications; inchoate mechanics' liens; extent
of restrictive covenants; and facts as to boundaries.
0. BROWDER, R. CUNNINGHAM & A. Smrm, BAsIc PROPERTY LAW 943-44 (4th ed. 1984) (citing
McDougal & Brabner-Smith, Land Title Transfer: A Regression, 48 YALE L.J. 1125, 1128
(1939)).
41. J. CRIBBET, supra note 21, at 218.
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sibilities are extraordinary. The level of competence and accuracy in record
keeping is wide ranging as well, with presentation running from handwriting
to computer cards. Officials and their staffs vary from incompetent to highly
trained and motivated professionals. Regrettably, the custodial office is often
political, with no prescribed qualifications, and the result is an officeholder
whose personal popularity may exceed professional competence.
Against this backdrop of myriad complexity and uncertainty, two addi-
tional problems confound the effort to provide a proper title assurance, and
both contribute to the overburdening of the recording system. The first
problem concerns substantive American property law. The intricate nature
of the various means by which and by whom title to realty may be held
aggravates and complicates any effort to improve the existing creaky system.
The second problem involves the vastly complicated procedures which must
be followed to identify and evaluate the substantive property law interests.
The first problem results from substantive American property law allowing
for the creation of too many legal interests. The British had the same problem
before 1925, and they realized that any successful new approach had to deal
with this aspect of the law as an integral part of the reform. Legal estates
creatable in most American states include at least: fee simple absolutes,
determinable fees, fees on condition, the life estates, the term of years,
various lesser tenancies, and a full range of traditional future interests. Even
fee tail still can be created in a few states.4 2 In addition to these legal estates,
various legal interests such as easements, licenses and restrictive covenants
can be created.
The problem of concurrent legal estates also remains. Not every state
recognizes all the traditional forms possible, but most have some form of
joint tenancy and tenancy in common. Many states recognize the marital
estate of tenancy by the entirety as well.43
A title search must also move through a maze of equitable interests of
all kinds. Many of these are recordable; some are not and yet may be
effective against a purchaser. The system requires meticulous confirmation
that fiduciaries have carried out details of their responsibilities regarding
retention or disposition of land. A searcher must confirm that necessary
court orders were obtained and establish evidence that sales conformed to
42. Although the fee tail estate can be created in a few states, it has little effect and often
can be defeated. See J. BRUCE, J. ELY, JR. & C. BOSTICK, supra note 19, at 292-93.
43. Either judicially or statutorily, the following jurisdictions recognize tenancy by the
entirety in some form: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, District of Columbia,
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming. Some
states have, abolished tenancy by the entirety explicitly while others either have not addressed




requirements of documents or statutes. Confirmation of appropriate dispersal
of any resulting proceeds is also necessary. Proper inquiry does not end with
the recording system but extends to investigation of conditions on the land
which may constitute notice even though not recorded.
The second problem of effective title assurance is evidenced by the searcher
who sorts through the records and discovers a procedural nightmare. Work-
ing through indexes that most often are name based, the searcher must first
construct a chain of title. More often than not, deeds fail to contain ref-
erences to former owners or to earlier deeds in which the same property
may have been differently described. 44 The searcher, therefore, is left to r"y
on evidence ranging from modern tax records to memories of those who
might recall the details of long past owners' lives and relationships. The
possibility for error in establishing the chain for the requisite period and
for examining the acts of each owner for the time required is thus very high.
Other problems include unadministered estates or improperly administered
estates; name changes through marriage, adoption, error and otherwise;
possibilities of large numbers of tenants in common, especially in cases of
large families with several generations of intestate deaths and unadministered
estates; marital rights flowing from either common law or statute; incom-
petency of owners; and vague or difficult to manage conditions in wills that
may shift estates on virtually as many contingencies as the mind can devise.
The list of potential pitfalls continues with such matters as modern consti-
tutional doubts about spousal prerogatives in dealing with realty held by
husband and wife as tenants by the entirety. There is as well the entire range
of claims by third parties against owners. These claims include taxes, judg-
ments and marital separation claims. 45 To add to the title examiner's dif-
44. See J. CBRmBET, supra note 21, at 219 (indicating that erroneous descriptions of property
lead to difficult cases and splits of authority with the modern trend being to uphold a bona
fide purchaser's interest in the property). Cf. 4 AM. LAw oF PRop., supra note 33, § 17.23
(stating that "in most cases the description is sufficient to make the instrument [judicially]
operative as between the parties, . . . but useless when a subsequent purchaser is involved
[because] the description is such that in examining the records to the land which he is buying
... he will not find it").
45. Title insurers refer to defects not revealed by searching the chain of title as "off-record
risks." See D. BuRKE, JR., LAw OF TrLE INsURANCE § 1.3.2 (1986). Burke lists examples of
these "off-record risks" as follows:
(1) the misindexing or misfiling of a document by the recorder,
(2) matters pertaining to the identity of the parties to a document,
(3) its delivery to the transferee, or
(4) the status of the party executing it-e.g., its execution by a
(a) married person whose property is subject to a claim of dower or courtesy [sic],
(b) an alien unable to hold property in a jurisdiction requiring citizenship as a pre-
condition to ownership, or
(c) an insolvent person whose creditors have a claim on the property through a trustee
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ficulties, the information to be gleaned requires the laborious search of many
different sources often housed in different offices or even different cities,
as described above.
A second fundamentally unacceptable feature of recordation is that this
tedious, expensive and often inaccurate process must be conducted more
than once to establish title. It is incomprehensible that the process is repeated
de novo on each occasion of transfer. Since the end product is a certificate
expressing a professional opinion as to the state of the title, the certifier
cannot afford to risk that opinion based on an earlier examination by another
person. Hence, each person making a certificate must form a judgment. It
is true, of course, that practice varies among the states. For example, lawyers
in some states search the records at the source itself and base their opinions
on this search, while in other states lawyers examine an "abstract" of the
records prepared by someone else, and carefully hedge their opinions re-
garding the accuracy of the abstract. 46 Another variation is to rely on the
title insurer to "certify the title" and to virtually eliminate the attorney, a
practice that has led to much dispute. 47
In each instance, therefore, an "expert" personally examines some record
for the period of time covered by the certificate. As a result, the hapless
client must pay for the endless duplication of effort. However, the necessity
in bankruptcy.
Id. at 23.
For examples of problems that can lead to difficulty in establishing a chain of title, see
Soreson v. Davis, 83 Iowa 405, 49 N.W. 1004 (1891) (holding that one who takes property from
another person, with notice that the property was held by tenants in common, cannot establish
a chain of title to the property independently of the other tenants in common); First Nat'l
Bank v. Spelts, 94 Neb. 387, 143 N.W. 218 (1913) (establishing that a mortgagee obtains legal
title to land and can convey this title to one, other than the mortgagor, who has only an
equitable title, and who pays the mortgage, and also establishing that a judgment lien against
the mortgagor neither attaches to the legal title nor interferes with the grantee's chain of title);
and, Garden of Memories, Inc. v. Forest Lawn Memorial Park Ass'n, 109 N.J. Super. 523,
264 A.2d 82 (1970) (deciding that when a deed refers to reservations and exceptions listed in
other deeds from a common grantor, but outside of the grantee's chain of title, the grantee
has constructive notice of the provisions in the other deeds and takes his title subject to the
reservations and exceptions, e.g., a mortgage secured by the property).
46. The examining attorney does not assume any responsibility for the correctness
of the abstract but limits his opinion to the title disclosed by the abstract records.
Any error in the abstract itself... is the fault of the company. Both the lawyer
and the abstracter may be liable to the client for any negligence in the areas of
their respective responsibilities.
J. CamBEar, supra note 21, at 228.
47. In many localities it is or has been customary to dispense with a formal abstract,
and in its stead the examiner merely "certifies the title," . . . basing his certificate
upon his personal examination of the records. This is merely an opinion of title,
and its worth depends wholly upon the learning, ability, and financial responsibility
of the individual rendering it.
G. WArIvmLE, An SRAcTs AND EXAMNATIONS OF TrrIL TO REAL PROPERTY § 90 (4th ed. 1921).
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to pay does not end with the examiner's certificate. In contemporary practice,
yet another expensive backstop in the patchwork of security has evolved:
title insurance.
C. Title Insurance
The certificate of title is worth only as much as the examiner's own
pocketbook (and perhaps as much as the professional liability insurer) can
bear in the event of error in the search. For this reason, the custom of
"insuring" titles to land has developed. At first there was a rather modest
start of hiring an "approved" attorney to examine title to property and
issuing, or not issuing, a policy based on that attorney's opinion. Subse-
quently, title insurance companies moved aggressively into the entire fabric
of conveyancing.45 In some cities it is common for those companies to have
their own title "factories" containing information, gleaned from official
records and various other sources, on many titles. The advantage for the
company lies in the fact that its records are more efficiently organized and
collated than those of the official agencies. Each policy issued is a separate
matter with each individual. If the same title, for example, should change
hands once each day for a week, seven different policies, each carrying a
full premium, may be required.4 9 This is true even though each policy was
based on essentially identical information available on the first day of the
week.
Beyond the expense, another fundamental objection to title insurance is
that policies are often quite limited in their scope of coverage. This practice
leads to substantial difficulties because the exceptions in policies often relate
to those problems most likely to be encountered. 0 The variety of exceptions,
coupled with policy limitations on the amount of liability, often not reflecting
the value of the property at the time of the loss, can lead to understandable
disillusionment in the insured. These inherent defects make questionable the
48. See, e.g., Johnstone, supra note 23, at 499-500, 506-08, 515-16 (discussing the role of
title insurance companies and their impact on attorneys' services); Residential Real Estate
Transactions: The Lawyer's Proper Role-Services-Compensation, 14 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J. 581, 604 (1979) (stating that "[iun some sections of the country the use of title insurance
has eliminated the lawyer from conveyancing or drastically reduced the lawyer's role").
49. Title insurance companies, however, allow a reissue credit when a new policy is pur-
chased. Chicago Title Insurance company makes the following provision for policy holders in
Tennessee: "A reissue credit is a 30% discount given on the premium amount for the new
owner's policy for the previous owner's coverage in force. Chicago Title will give a reissue
credit for any previous owner's policy issued by a reputable title company." CmcAGO TrrLE
INs. Co., RATE CARD (effective Feb. 19, 1987).
50. See Johnstone, supra note 23, at 494-95 (indicating that title insurance companies
generally "except any risks apparent after the title has been examined" and that they "frequently




actual efficiency of this lucrative business in affording a proper measure of
protection.
D. The American Registration Acts
In terms of enduring impact on the American title assurance scheme, the
registration acts in the various states deserve little attention. Yet it is because
they so resemble the present British system which is discussed in this Article
that they must be evaluated as important precursors of what may come.-"
Their importance lies in the fact that they represent early attempts in this
country to register the title to land itself, rather than simply to register
evidence of title. The statutes should be examined not so much for the details
of their provisions as for a general assessment of why they failed. At their
zenith, early in this century, some twenty states and one or two territories
had adopted some version of registration. 2 Many of those states have since
repealed the statutes. 3 In no state was the system compulsory and that
feature, along with the inevitable hassle and expense of initial registration,
contributed heavily to their failure. It is interesting to note that when the
system of registration in England was largely voluntary, it too failed.5 4 The
compensatory funds, such an essential feature of fairness if the system is to
rigorously protect the credibility of the register, were inadequate. 55
Initial difficulties of registration were formidable. Even if the certificate
were finally issued, it could only be effective if notice had been given to all
interests involved and opportunity to defend had been provided . 6 Rigid
constitutional notions of due process had to be observed and accommodated
before conclusiveness of registration could be assured. In some states, com-
pliance was deemed to mean a full scale judicial proceeding, and attempts
to substitute cheaper and more efficient administrative procedures were found
to be unconstitutional.57 As discussed below, hopefully the constitutional
51. For short summaries on the effectiveness of title registration statutes in Australia and
Canada, see V. DiCASTRi, THOM'S CANADIAN TORRENS SYSTEM 161-62 (2d ed. 1962); D. JACKSON,
PRiNcIPLas OF PROPERTY LAW 106 (1967).
52. California, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Minnesota,
Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. 6A R. POWELL & P.
ROHAN, supra note 15, 908[4] n.43.
53. California, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, South Da-
kota, Tennessee, and Utah. Id. 908[4] n.44.
54. R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, supra note 6, at 195-96.
55. Assurance funds were operated either separately for each county or on a state-wide
basis. Both the fund for California and the fund for York County, Nebraska were completely
exhausted and a deficiency existed which would absorb future payments. See R. POWELL, supra
note 1, at 72.
56. Id. at 131-32, 239-41 (citing People v. Chase, 165 Ill. 527, 46 N.E. 454 (1896); State
v. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St. 575, 47 N.E. 551 (1897)).
57. See, e.g., State v. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St. at 618, 47 N.E. at 556.
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position has shifted sufficiently in this century to permit the non-judicial
administration of a successful system similar to the system in England, despite
the fact that due process concerns in other areas of law may have even
intensified. 8
No attempt was made in these early statutes or in concurrent legislation
to limit the number of estates with which the registration scheme would
have to cope. Consequently, the need to account for all possible legal and
equitable arrangements remained within the purview of the acts. In leaving
intact multiple details of the many legal estates possible and the need to
account for all manner of trust disposition, the American legislation differed
dramatically from that in England where the substantive property law was
made far simpler and, therefore, more manageable in registration matters.
Above all, the registration acts failed in the United States because judges
in many jurisdictions were unwilling to accord a high degree of conclusiveness
to registration, especially in those cases in which to do so would have
offended the equity notion of fairness.5 9 Such inbred concerns, based as they
are on excellent premises in context, are difficult to overcome, even when
the legislative mandate seems unambiguous. When it becomes clear that the
conclusiveness of registration in itself presents the fairest resolution in terms
of cost and efficiency to the greatest number of people in a vast and complex
society, these fundamental objections may well disappear. The difficulties
in the English registration scheme and the judicial interpretations of the
same problems as they appear in this Article are highly instructive in how
a successful, modern American scheme might evolve.
III. THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE
Old habits die hard in England. A probably apocryphal story tells of the
distinguished solicitor who was taken up on a high hill overlooking the
gorgeous farms of an English countryside. He stood for a moment and said:
"The sight of all that registered land makes me sick." Colleagues at a British
university are fond of telling another story involving the elderly professor
at a fine university who until the mid-1970's always referred to the 1925
Land Acts as "the recent land legislation.' '6 These comments demonstrate
that England is a land much given to the values of tradition, and provide
one all the more reason to marvel at the Acts' excellent success.
58. See R. POWELL, supra note 1, at 199-201 (citing State v. Westfall, 85 Minn. 437, 89
N.W. 175 (1902)).
59. See R. POWELL, supra note 1, at 118, 140, 205, 250 (citing, inter alia, Covey v. Talalah
Estates Corp., 183 Ga. 442, 188 S.E. 822 (1932); Sheaff v. Spindler, 339 Ill. 540, 171 N.E.
632 (1930); Boart v. Martin, 99 Minn. 197, 108 N.W. 945 (1906); Kirk v. Mullen, 100 Ore.
563, 197 P. 300 (1921).




At the outset, it should be said that this Article does not undertake to
weigh and evaluate exhaustively each provision of the British land legislation
of 1925. This is not an effort to evaluate acts for their own sake or for a
British audience concerned primarily with the efficacy of their operation
there. The statutes are discussed selectively for those qualities and weaknesses
which might bear specifically on an American adaptation. It is necessary to
set out the legislation to make the statutes and their operation understand-
able. The British cases analyzed are those which have illuminated most clearly
the advantages and pitfalls that have become apparent over six decades.
A. Before the Great Reform
Prior to the 1880's, the British land law mosaic incorporated the full range
of legal and equitable interests that had been developed laboriously by the
common law and equity courts, with an occasional Parliamentary contri-
bution, since the time of the Norman conquest. There had been episodical
patchwork reform of the system such as abolition of some of the most
bizarre Common Law rules. 61 In addition, the Rule Against Perpetuities had
developed, and methods of conveyancing gradually had become more so-
phisticated. 62 Much of this reform occurred early in the nineteenth century,
but until the latter part of that century, no reform of a broadly comprehensive
nature had emerged. Interestingly, legal title to realty continued to be proved
by an ownership land deed coupled with physical possession of the land.
To a far greater extent than in the United States, where recordation systems
had sprung up early in its history, the British continued for a very long time
to rely on the less sophisticated title deeds coupled with possession, which
together constituted a form of proof which was said to bind all the world
as to the legal title. There were some early attempts at registration, 6 but
they were in no way pervasive or successful programs of registration in the
modern sense.
The British have had a notion, tracing at least from Henry VIII's ill-fated
Statute of Enrollments, 64 that public recordation of ownership evidence con-
61. See supra note 6.
62. It was eventually settled that the lives in being could be chosen at random and be
completely unconnected with the property. Further, the period of twenty-one years after the
life in being could be extended by actual periods of gestation. The Perpetuities and Accumu-
lations Act, 1964, ch. 55, modified the rule to void only interests which must vest, if at all,
outside the perpetuity period. It also allowed designation of a fixed perpetuity period not to
exceed eighty years.
The deed of grant became the common form of conveyance by virtue of the Real Property
Act, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., ch. 106, § 2. Conveyance by feoffment was abolished pursuant to Law
of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 20, § 51. See R. MEGAoRY & H. WADE, supra
note 6, at 241-42, 1172.
63. See, e.g., Land Registry Act, 1862, 25 & 26 Vict., ch. 53; Land Transfer Act, 1875,
38 & 39 Vict., ch. 87. See also R. MEoARRY & H. WADE, supra note 6, at 195-96.
64. Statute of Enrollments, 27 Hen. 8, ch. 16 (1535).
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stitutes an invasion of privacy and perhaps leads the tax collector to know
more than is desirable. This historical oddity has permeated the modem land
legislation so that even today the British handle registered items with ex-
traordinary secrecy and confidentiality. The excessive confidentiality of the
registration system constitutes a substantial weakness in the operation of the
Land Registration Act.65 -
While deeds coupled with physical possession traditionally evidenced legal
interests, equitable interests were evidenced by ancient concepts of notice of
their existence, fairness, and the identity of the claimant as a purchaser,
donee, or some other transferee. No recordation or registration provision
existed to protect equitable interests. 6
Change, however, began in earnest in the late nineteenth century, not only
in matters of title assurance, but in substantive property law as well. The
Settled Land Act of 188267 was an early effort to fundamentally reform the
English land law. Like that of its successor, the Settled Land Act of 1925,6
the purpose of the 1882 legislation was to free settled land from the long-
term entanglements imposed upon it by those wishing to perpetuate land in
the family for generations to come. Both the Acts of 1882 and 1925 frustrated
this desire by vesting in a "tenant for life'69 wide powers to sell and otherwise
deal with the fee simple title, treating any successive interests as interests in
personalty only.70 In other words, the successive interests were taken off the
land and placed on the money.
The early legislation was innovative in the 1880's, but it became increasingly
irrelevant because changing patterns in the nature of wealth in Britain made
the use of a settlement unpopular.7 ' In 1894, when death duties were imposed
on successive transfers within a settlement, 72 the settlement became even
more unpopular, explaining in part why the Settled Land Act of 1925 never
65. See R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, supra note 6, at 195, 218; Land Registration Act, 1925,
15 & 16- Geo. 5, ch. 21, § 112; Land Registration Rules, S.R. & 0. 1925 No. 1093, r.12.
66. See H. HANBURY, MODERN EQuITY 21-28 (9th ed. 1969); E. SNtE, SNELL'S PRINCIPLES
OF EQUITY 24-25 (26th ed. 1966).
67. Settled Land Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict., ch. 38.
68. Settled Land Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 18.
69. The tenant for life is the person of full age who is for the time being beneficially
entitled under a settlement to possession of settled land for his life .... This
includes persons with life interests, a tenant in tail, a tenant in fee simple subject
to a gift over or to family charges, a tenant for years terminable on life, a tenant
pur autrie vie, a person entitled to the income of land for his own life or any
other life, and others.
Id. §§ 19(1), 20(1). See also R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, supra note 6, at 350.
70. R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, supra note 6, at 321, 398 (citing Settled Land Act, 1882, 45
& 46 Vict., ch. 38, §§ 20, 22(5), 39(1); Settled Land Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 18, § 72).
71. J. RIDDALL, supra note 7, at 124.
72. It is said that the grand fleet of World War I was built with the monies raised from
this tax. See K. GRAY & P. Syams, supra note 12, at 157 n.6 (citing F. LAWSON, INTRODUCTION
TO THE LAW OF PROPERTY 94f (1958)).
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took hold.73 The great legislative effort waxed and waned in the first decade
or so of this century, 4 was delayed by the First World War and its aftermath,
and finally proceeded in 1925 only after some remarkable compromises.
B. The Legislation of 1925
1. The Grand Design
In the four acts discussed below, Parliament was concerned with four
broad legislative purposes. 7 One purpose of the acts was to reduce the
number of legal estates in land to a manageable number so that the purchaser
would have to deal with a minimal number of estates and parties in securing
good legal title. A further very important benefit from the drastic reduction
in the number of legal estates was to make possible a simpler land registration
system.
A second purpose of the acts was to provide a system of registration
which would mirror exactly, at any point in time, the status of title to real
estate. The title so appearing would have been judicially determined and
guaranteed by the state.
The third purpose of the acts, achieved through the use of the trust device,
was to sweep equitable estates and interests off the legal title and into the
fund created by a sale of the land. By such process the purchaser only had
to know that equitable arrangements existed in order to pay the purchase
money over to the appropriate trustees. Upon making payment, the purchaser
was totally relieved of the details and consequences of the trust arrangements.
Finally, the acts were meant to provide appropriate protection for "com-
mercial" type encumbrances, as opposed to "family" type encumbrances.
73. The change in the nature of British wealth and the adverse tax consequences of the
strict settlement combined to cause conveyancers to avoid the creation of the arrangement,
resulting in its present archaic nature. See id. at 156-57.
74. Although title registration had experienced the support of both political parties since
1885, had commanded a majority in the House of Lords since 1893, and was the official policy
of the Law Society from 1895, the years preceding World War I contained considerable
compromises. In 1911, the report of the Royal Commission on Land Transfer Acts (which
received much input from Chief Registrar C.F. Brickdale) recommended abolition of the County
Veto, but refused extension of compulsory registration until the system was perfected in London.
The Law Society, through President Humphreys, countered with a bill opposing the abolition
of the County Veto and any extension of compulsory registration. The compromise worked
out between Brickdale and Humphreys was abolition of the County Veto in return for an
increase in solicitors' scale fees. See Offer, supra note 7, at 505-12.
Negotiations, however, came to a halt in 1912 with the illness and resignation of Lord
Loreburn, a vocal opponent of the solicitors who maintained that the high cost of transfer
was inhibiting the diffusion of property. The basic outline of the present system was embodied
in legislation introduced in 1913 and reintroduced and amended in 1914, but the exigencies of
World War I halted further progress until 1919. Id.
75. See K. GRAY & P. Sy'ims, supra note 12, at 320-21; R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, supra
note 6, at 123.
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To achieve all these purposes, the acts did two things. First, they reduced
the number of legal estates to two: the fee simple absolute and the legal
term of years. 76 All other legal estates formerly possible still could be created,
but only as some form of equitable interest. 77 The equitable mandate ex-
empted the term of years because it was seen most often as a business
arrangement, and as such, often an inappropriate candidate for use behind
a trust arrangement. In addition to reducing the number of possible legal
estates, the acts provided for certain legal "interests ' 78 other than "estates"
to be created. Examples of such interests are easements and profits which
are of the same duration as the legal estates. An easement for life, therefore,
can be created only as an equitable interest, but an easement for a term of
twenty-one years can be created as a legal interest.79
The second way in which the acts achieved Parliament's purposes was to
divide equitable estates and interests into two basic categories: those that
can be overreached, and those that cannot be overreached. 0 In the first
category are all of the so-called family arrangements. Family arrangements,
such as strict settlements, involve either direct grants to family members in
succession, or a similar conveyance to trustees on comparable uses. These
arrangements are overreached when the property is sold so that the interests
of the equitable owners have no relation to the land and need not be the
concern of the purchasers. The concept of overreaching is that the equitable
interests of beneficiaries are detached from the land and attached instead. to
the purchase money paid to the trustees for the land. In this sense, over-
reaching means "being detached from the land." The equitable owners'
interests are attached instead to the fund created by the pdrchase price and
are protected in that manner. 81
The second basic category involves the equitable interests that cannot be
overreached. Into this category fall restrictive covenants, estate contracts,
and certain equitable interests in the land of another, such as an equitable
easement. These are regarded as "commercial" equitable interests as opposed
to "family" equitable interests and as such cannot be overridden.8 2 Some
of the legislation defines and governs only family settlements, and different
76. Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 20, § 1(1).
77. Id. § 1(3).
78. See id. § 1(2).
79. R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, supra note 6, at 125.
80. The device of overreaching allows land to be sold free from an equitable interest, even
though the purchaser has notice of it. The holder of the interest loses any prospect of enjoying
the land itself, but obtains a corresponding interest in the purchase money. The distinction
between overreaching and an interest being overridden is that with the latter, the interest is
void (ceases to be an interest in any property) against a purchaser of the legal estate who is
without notice, or who fails to register. Id. at 137.
81. See K. GRAY & P. Symms, supra note 12, at 75-76 (noting objectionable aspects of the
involuntary conversion of a right in realty to a right in personalty (i.e., money)).
82. See J. RIDDALL, supra note 7, at 427-28.
[Vol. 63:55
LAND TITLE REGISTRATION
statutory arrangements often define and govern commercial interests.83 Both
types of equitable interests are contemplated and dealt with by the Land
Registration Act of 1925, as will be seen below.
2. The Implementing Acts
All of the changes discussed above were the product of some six pieces
of legislation enacted by Parliament in 1925. Two of these acts, the Admin-
istration of Estates Act 4 and the Trustee Act"', are beyond the purview of
this Article and will not be considered here. The acts discussed are: the Law
of Property Act, 6 the Settled Land Act, 7 the Land Charges Act,88 and the
Land Registration Act. s9
To grasp what the legislation intended, it should be understood that the
acts interrelate. Some were enacted as temporary measures until the Land
Registration Act could be brought into full operation.9 Parliament recog-
nized that effective and full implementation of the Registration Act would
take considerable time. But in 1925, no one foresaw the Great Depression,
the Second World War, and the various economic problems that were to
afflict Great Britain and delay full application of the Act to the present
day. 9'
To ensure a mechanism for handling affairs under the Settled Land Act
and the Law of Property Act, interim arrangements were provided. These
arrangements still prevail where the land is not yet within a registered land
jurisdiction (perhaps twenty percent of England and Wales at this writing),
or where the land is within a registered land area, but no statutorily defined
83. Although "land" is defined as including easements both in the Law of Property Act,
1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 20, § 205(I)(ix) and in the Settled Land Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo.
5, ch. 18, § 117(1)(ix), provisions governing notice of easements or acquisition of the same are
in the Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 20, § 200, and in the Land Registration
Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 21, § 108.
84. Administration of Estates Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 23.
85. Trustee Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 19.
86. Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 20.
87. Settled Land Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 18.
88. Land Charges Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 22, amended by Land Charges Act 1972,
ch. 61.
89. Land Registration Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 21.
90. Pursuant to the Settled Land Act, § 119(3), that act is subject to the provisions of the
Land Registration Act. Scholars have noted that since not all land is subject to registration,
two different systems of law operate side by side-one for registered land and one for unre-
gistered land. The outcome of particular situations may differ according to which system applies
and some statutes apply to one or the other system only. See, e.g., J. RrDDALL, supra note 7,
at 446-47.
91. By 1980, three-quarters of the population of the country was located in compulsory
registration areas and by 1983, approximately eight million titles were on the register. See R.
MEGARRY & H. VADE, supra note 6, at 199. Approximately seventy-five percent of convey-
ances involve registration. J. BRUCE, J. ELY, JR. & C. BosTIcK, supra note 19, at 647.
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event has occurred to require the registration of the particular tract of land
in question. 92
For unregistered land, the general scheme of the 1925 legislation provides
that:
(a) Legal title need not be registered, but continues to be validated by
ancient title deeds and possession concepts; 93
(b) Family economic arrangements such as strict settlements94 are governed
by either the Settled Land Act or the "trust for sale" provisions of the Law
of Property Act,95 which provide for notice of any equitable interests of this
kind; and
(c) Commercial claims and interests such as "estate contracts" are pro-
tected by registration under the Land Charges Act. 96 That Act deals almost
exclusively with specified equitable interests of the commercial variety. Be-
cause the Land Registration Act provides for the equitable commercial in-
terests fully, it was believed in 1925 that as the registered land system spread,
the Land Charges Act, all purposes of which are subsumed into that broader
Act, would pass into oblivion.
In summary, the reform acts made interim provisions for protection of
all the possibilities pending the arrival of the Registered Land Act: legal
estates and interests in the way they existed prior to 1925; family type
overreachable interests through the Settled Land Act or the trust for sale;
and commercial, non-overreachable arrangements by the Land Charges Act.
The substance of those acts, as a background to how they influence the
registration scheme, will be examined in the next section.
a. The Settled Land Act of 1925
The Settled Land Act is designed to define and manage private economic
arrangements relating to land, primarily family settlements, by forcing all
future interests behind a trust.97 The details of the trust are of no interest
or concern to a purchaser who has bought from the person entitled to convey
the legal fee simple absolute title.9s The Act, though ingenious in concept,
is marred by unnecessary complexity. This is especially so because it requires
two instruments to achieve a proper settlement: the "vesting deed" and the
92. In areas where compulsory registration is in effect, a conveyance on sale of the fee
simple absolute, a grant of a term of years absolute, or assignment of a term of years absolute
(each of the latter requiring a future term of at least forty years) triggers the registration
requirement. Land Registration Act, § 123(1).
93. See K. GrAy & P. Sycms, supra note 12, at 87.
94. See supra text accompanying note 81.
95. K. GAy & P. Symas, supra note 12, at 154, 216-17.
96. See 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 22.
97. See supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
98. See J. RIDDALL, supra note 7, at 116.
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trust instrument itself.99 In addition, there are taxation disadvantages attached
to the use of a settlement under the Act.1° These problems have led the
legal profession to virtually abandon the Act, especially since all of its
purposes can be accomplished through the simpler trust for sale device
without the major tax problems. 0 1 A settlement under the Settled Land Act
is most likely to be encountered today when a careless conveyancer fails to
properly create a trust for sale, because the Settled Land Act by its terms
applies to any settlement that is not a part of a trust for sale. 102
Despite its relegation to little more than a snare for the uninformed or
the careless, the Settled Land Act does contain some features that should
be of interest to an American audience considering reform. The Act builds
on the Law of Property Act's provisions, reducing the number of possible
legal estates to two and forcing all other interests under a settlement into
equitable interests behind a trust. Consequently, the critical feature of this
Act is the role of the person designated as the "tenant for life."'0 3 This
person may in fact be a life tenant under the terms of the settlement, but
the individual also may be one who holds any present estate, even one other
than a traditional life tenancy.4 4 The significance of the position is that the
tenant for life, in virtually all cases, holds the legal title to the fee simple
absolute. 0 5 That position carries the right to convey the legal title and to
deal effectively as full owner in other respects for both the benefit of the
tenant for life, in whatever present possessory equitable interest that person
holds under the settlement, and for the benefit of all other equitable own-
ers. 10 6 All equitable interests in the land are thereby overreached and attached
to the fund created by the action in lieu of the interest in the land. 10 7
Trustees of the settlement, of which there are usually two, have a rather
broad supervisory power over the land and the duty to receive monies
resulting from transactions involving the property.'01 For the most part,
however, the active role of trustee is played by the tenant for life rather
than by those persons designated as trustees. The tenant for life receives
this broad authority over the property on the theory that this person is
entitled to possession and is logically the most likely person with whom a
prospective purchaser would want to deal.' 9 It is unfortunate that an un-
99. See Settled Land Act § 4(1).
100. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
101. K. GRAY & P. SymaS, supra note 12, at 156-57.
102. See Settled Land Act § 1(7), amended by Law of Property (Amendment) Act, 1926,
16 & 17 Geo. 5, ch. 11, § 7.
103. See Settled Land Act §§ 19, 20, 21.
104. See supra note 69.
105. See Settled Land Act § 4(2).
106. See id. §§ 16(1)(i), 38, 107.
107. See id. § 18(1). See also supra note 80 and accompanying text.
108. See Settled Land Act § 95.
109. See K. GRAY & P. SyiSEs, supra note 12, at 67.
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necessary complexity effectively defeated the Settled Land Act. It is one of
the more interesting pieces of the 1925 legislation and held considerable
potential for accomplishing some of the major goals of the overall scheme." 0
If land is held under a settlement in a land registration situation, the land
is registered in the name of the tenant for life as proprietor.", The interests
of the beneficiaries of the settlement are protected by entering an appropriate
''restriction" on the register indicating that the land is settled land.'' 2 The
effect of such a restrictive entry is that any purchaser will be on notice that
the land is settled land and must be dealt with only under the terms of the
Settled Land Act if an effective transfer is to occur."' At no time would
the purchaser know, or need to know, of the provisions of the trust in the
settlement." 4 As long as the purchaser abides by the provisions of the Settled
Land Act in making the transfer and paying the monies to the appropriate
parties, the purchaser can be totally indifferent to the ultimate distribution
of those monies.
The overall complexity of the Settled Land Act makes it an unlikely
candidate for an American adaptation. Nevertheless, parts of its provisions,
especially the role accorded to the tenant for life in both holding the legal
title and enjoying broad authority for dealing with the land, might be utilized
in conjunction with some of the more versatile provisions of the Law of
Property Act to good result." 5
b. The Law of Property Act of 1925
The Law of Property Act of 1925 is a remarkable piece of legislation,
both for its innovations and for the fact that it managed to pass through
Parliament." 6 Virtually overnight, this Act swept away the practice of cen-
110. While American landowners generally have never been subject to the same preoccupation
with family settlements as English landowners, the concept of the tenant for life could be
beneficial by adapting it for use with concurrent interests, such as joint tenancies and co-
tenancies.
111. See Land Registration Act § 86(1).
112. See id. § 86(3).
113. See K. GRAY & P. Sytams, supra note 12, at 326.
114. This follows from the fact that the presence of the restriction on the register requires
that effective dispositions must be made under the terms of the Settled Land Act, 1925; and
pursuant to Settled Land Act, § 110(2), a purchaser of settled land is generally not entitled to
review the provisions of the trust instrument. See J. RIDDALL, supra note 7, at 428.
115. The tenant for life concept merits special consideration because the person in actual
possession of the land is logically the one most likely to be consulted by prospective purchasers.
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
116. Following World War I, proposals for reform were again introduced at Parliament;
however, the Law Society continued to oppose abolition of the County Veto. Initially, the
solicitors priced their support for the measure, including abolition of the veto, at a three-year
postponement of extending the area under compulsory registration. Subsequently, the length
of the postponement was increased to five and eventually to ten years. At one point Chief
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turies. It is difficult to imagine an American jurisdiction acting quite so
broadly or boldly as this, at least in regard to land.1 7 Hopefully, an as-
sessment of the success of the British legislation might encourage some to
try. The resistance in Parliament was formidable, and final passage took
place only after appeasing some in the House of Lords by incorporating
such measures as retaining the fee tail estate, which survives even today as
a rather curious relic among such advanced provisions." '
As stated, the Act's provisions are wide ranging. For purposes here, two
segments are of special interest: the sections defining the new legal and
equitable interests possible, 1 9 and the provisions relating to the trust for
sale.'2 
o
It is certainly one of the most valuable aspects of the "estates" system
in Anglo-American law that the concept of ownership, measured on a plane
of time, permits extraordinary flexibility in the quality of possible arrange-
Registrar Brickdale remarked that there was no use in making concessions to the Law Society,
since they always asked for more. Once the solicitors began mobilizing opposition to repeal of
the County Veto, compromise was reached on the basis of a ten-year postponement. See Offer,
supra note 7, at 514-21.
There remained three primary obstacles to enactment. First, the Land Union representatives
in the House of Lords demanded and received a public inquiry at the end of the ten-year
postponement with further extension of compulsory registration conditioned on the affirmative
vote of both Houses of Parliament. Second, radical elements in the House of Commons
acquiesced only after trade unions were allowed to lease or buy more than one acre of land,
which was previously forbidden by the Trades Union Act 1871. Finally, following initial
enactment in 1922 and passage of the consolidating bills in 1925, the solicitors renewed their
opposition to extending the area of compulsory registration. Id.
The solicitors' support was secured by increasing their scale fees on registered land. The
effect of this last concession was to maintain the monopoly that solicitors had previously held
with regard to land transactions, while simultaneously lowering their costs and increasing the
cost to the public. Id.
117. See Comment, The Torrens System of Title Registration: A New Proposal for Effective
Implementation, 29 UCLA L. REv. 661, 668-71 (1982) (addressing the reasons for opposition
to land law reform, especially that of the title industry which derives its livelihood from the
current system). As noted earlier, efforts at reform in the United States have been unsuccessful
thus far. See supra notes 21-23, 51-59 and accompanying text.
Dean Cribbet has enunciated several proposals for reform. See J. CRMBET, supra note 21,
at 322-31. He also alludes to lawyers' vested interests in title assurance and warns that "[a]
desire to protect their own financial stake should not lead them into self-defeating attacks on
... [others who] may be able to provide adequate service at reasonable cost." Id. at 332.
In a similar vein, other commentators have noted that:
[t]itle insurance companies, abstract companies and title lawyers have, in general,
vigorously opposed the Torrens system, fearing that universal adoption of the
system would practically remove the need for title insurance, would put abstract
companies out of business, and might well require title attorneys to reduce their
fees for title examination very substantially.
0. BROWDER, R. CUNNINGRAM & A. SIrH, supra note 40, at 969.
118. See Law of Property Act § 130.
119. See id. § 1.
120. See id. §§ 23-36, 205(l)(xxix).
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ments.12 1 Consequently, when the decision was taken to reduce the number
of possible legal estates to two, it was vital that the former legal estates
survive in the form of equitable estates. There was no conceptual or practical
objection to the existence of these estates, 22 because the estates were essential
to flexible arrangements. The objection was that the equitable estates attached
to land in such a way that the identity of an owner, who was always able
to convey the total fee simple estate, could be lost for long periods of time.123
The solution was to permit the creation of the former legal estates but now
only in equity, where they had long been creatable in any event. Then, at
least in the case of family settlements, the provisions of the settlement
attached to the proceeds of a sale when overreached by the sale of the legal
title. 124 Rights of the commercial type were, of course, not overreached and
were protected by notice to the purchaser, first through the vehicle of the
Land Charges Act,1 25 and ultimately through the Land Registration Act. 26
A second major variance of the Law of Property Act was its treatment
of concurrent estates. 27 Those who developed the legislation recognized that
one of the principal factors that would overwork a registration system was
the old practice of permitting the creation of unlimited numbers of legal
tenancies in common. If undivided shares could be created in vast numbers
of owners at law, the volume of matters necessary to be registered relating
to that ownership might either overwhelm the system or make it so cum-
bersome as to compromise the basic need for simplicity.'2 This situation
was perceived as a fundamental difficulty in establishing title. 29 Provisions
that treated any named concurrent tenants as joint tenants holding the
121. The estate concept is unique to Anglo-American land law. See A. CASNER & W. LEACH,
supra note 21, at 244.
122. The rationale for converting former legal estates into equitable interests was to require
their satisfaction from money generated by the transfer rather than from the land itself.
123. For example, the intestate death of a co-tenant, leaving ninety-seven next-of-kin, pre-
sented particular problems for prospective purchasers. Likewise, difficulties are encountered
where the remainder following a life estate is held by an infant. A sale might not be possible
until the infant attained majority. See J. RIDDALL, supra note 7, at 457-58.
124. See Law of Property Act § (1)(a).
125. See Land Charges Act § 2(5) (allowing registrations as a Class D land charge on the
register of land charges); Land Charges Act § 4(6) (providing that Class D land charges are
void against a purchaser for value unless they are registered).
126. See Land Registration Act § 70(2) (requiring notice on the register at the time of initial
registration of any easement, right, privilege or benefit which is created by instrument and
which appears on the title adversely affecting the land).
127. See Law of Property Act §§ 34-38.
128. See 39 PAta. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 258-59 (1920) (remarks of Lord Chancellor Birkenhead
during debate on second reading of the Law of Property Bill); 155 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.)
390 (1922) (remarks of the Solicitor General, Sir Leslie Scott, in debate on the Law of Property
Bill as amended in the Standing Committee).
129. See supra note 128. See also 154 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 95-96 (1922) (remarks of




property on implied trust for sale for themselves, and perhaps for others as
well, resolved the matter. 30 In England, it is no longer possible to own legal
title to land concurrently except on trust for sale as joint tenants. 3' The
number of joint tenants holding legal title on trust for sale is limited to
four. 32 Whether the equitable interests behind the trust are also joint inter-
ests, or whether those interests are treated as equitable tenancies in common,
depends on the circumstances of the basic transactions. 33 Either result is
possible. With the number of legal title holders limited to four, and with
the survivorship features of joint tenancy further simplifying matters, the
registration procedures and conveyancing concerns remain relatively unclut-
tered.
The third principal innovation of the Law of Property Act important to
this Article was that the Act introduced the trust for sale. 34 This device
proved so successful and popular in its relative simplicity of operation that
it soon drove the more cumbersome machinery of the Settled Land Act out
of business. 3
The fundamental premise of the trust for sale is that when land is trans-
ferred on a settlement, that is, on successive interests, and when there is a
mandatory direction to the trustees to sell the property to implement the
trust, a trust for sale arises under the Law of Property Act, rather than a
settlement under the Settled Land Act. 36 Legal title rests in the trustees for
sale, 37 and the trustees, two of whom are required in most instances, must
manage the property and act in accordance with the mandate of the trust. 38
While the creation of a trust for sale requires that the property be sold, and
does not give merely a power or entitlement to sell it, it is a curiosity of
the operation of the trust for sale that immediate sale is not necessary.13
Indeed, the device is often used to implement a long term family settlement
when the expectation is that the property will not be sold for a very long
period of time, if ever. 14° Such a course may, however, require the consent
of the beneficiaries.' 14 The interests of the beneficiaries are in effect converted
to personalty since the property is required to be sold and "equity looks on
130. See Law of Property Act §§ 34(2), 36(1).
131. Id. § 34(1).
132. Id. § 34(2).
133. See R. MEGARRY & H. VADE, supra note 6, at 446.
134. Law of Property Act § 205(l)(xxix).
135. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
136. See Law of Property Act § 205(1)(xxix); Settled Land Act § 1(7).
137. Law of Property Act, sched. 1, pt. II, §§ 3, 6(b).
138. See id. § 3(1)(0).
139. See id. § 25 (granting the trustees for sale the power to postpone the sale without
incurring any liability). See also R. MEGARRY & H. VADE, supra note 6, at 392.
140. See, e.g., In re Evers' Trust (Papps v. Evers), [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1327, 1330 (C.A.).
141. See, e.g., In re Inns (Inns v. Wallace), 1947 Ch. 576, 582; Re Herklot's Will Trusts
(Temple v. Scorer), [1964] 1 W.L.R. 583, 589 (Ch. 1963).
1987]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
that as done which ought to be done."'' 42 For purposes of devolution, for
instance, the assets are treated as personalty.' 4 Elaborate provisions govern
the responsibilities of the trustees in taking into account the views of the
equitable owners in making their decisions. 44 Unlike the trustees of the
settlement in Settled Land matters, the trust for sale trustees perform as
active, responsible fiduciaries in the management, general decision-making
and sale of the trust property. 45 Theirs is not a supervisory role; it is an
active, decision-making role.'
The trust for sale may arise in ways other than direct, express provision. 46
For example, it is implied when titleholders convey to grantees as concurrent
owners. 47 As stated above, irrespective of what was said or intended, the
grantees are deemed to be joint tenants to the legal title and they are deemed
to hold the ownership of the equitable interests for themselves and others
in whatever form is appropriate. Trust for sale is also implied in circum-
stances in which legal title is in fact held by one person, but under conditions
where the legal tile holder should be deemed as trustee for one or more
persons, perhaps including the trustee. 48
An implied trust may arise most often in the case of the marital home.
Without doubt, marital home ownership and the problem of the protection
of that home for both spouses, has emerged as a major concern for the
entire field of land law, especially as it relates to the Land Registration
Act. 149 When both spouses contribute to the purchase price of a marital
home, and the legal title is taken in the name of one only, usually the
husband, the courts, without a clear legislative mandate, now imply a trust.
Moreover, the trust implied is a trust for sale, with the spouse in whose
name the legal title is held taking that title as trustee for sale for both
spouses. 50 The difficulty posed for a purchaser in discovering this implied
trust has posed a serious problem when the legal titleholder acts without
authority and outside the parameters of the Act in dealing with the realty.'"
An English case, Caunce v. Caunce,152 involved a marital home, and was
instrumental in establishing that, in hard cases, certainty of title is more
important than rough justice equity solutions. Caunce involved a non-reg-
istered land area of the country where the legal title to a matrimonial home
142. J. RIDDALL, supra note 7, at 135.
143. In re Kempthorne (Charles v. Kempthorne), [1930] 1 Ch. 268, 275-76 (C.A. 1929).
144. See Law of Property Act § 26(3).
145. See id. § 28.
146. See id. §§ 34, 36.
147. Id. § 36(1).
148. See Bull v. Bull, [1955] 1 Q.B. 234, 238 (C.A. 1954).
149. Thompson, Registration, Fraud and Notice, 44 CAMBRMGF L.J. 280 (1985).
150. See Waller v. Waller, [1967] 1 W.L.R. 451, 453 (Ch. 1966).
151. See, e.g., Caunce v. Caunce, [1969] 1 W.L.R. 286, 289 (Ch. 1968); Williams & Glyn's
Bank Ltd. v. Boland, [1980] 3 W.L.R 138, 141.
152. Caunce, [1969] 1 W.L.R. 286.
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was solely in the husband. Nevertheless, the wife had an equitable interest
in the property by reason of her contribution to the purchase price. Although
the wife occupied the property with her husband, the court held that the
bank to whom the husband mortgaged the property was not put on notice
of any rights stemming purely from the marital status.5 3 The court said that
her possession was consistent with her status as a spouse and, consequently,
constituted no notice. 15 4 The bank prevailed.
Apparently Caunce is still the law regarding unregistered land despite the
fact that the House of Lords reached a different result in a similar case,
Williams & Glyn's Bank v. Boland, which involved registered land. 55 In
Boland, the decision in Caunce was questioned, but not overturned. The
House of Lords' decision in the Boland case clearly established that a wife
similarly situated to the wife in Caunce, but in a registered land context,
would by reason of her possession and her equitable interest have an over-
riding interest that would defeat a bank mortgage. 5 6 A highly undesirable
difference of result occurs, therefore, in unregistered and registered land
settings when the facts are otherwise the same. The Caunce case reduces the
obligation of inquiry to include only those in possession. The Boland decision
reaches the opposite result in the registration context on similar facts.
In summary, the Law of Property Act dramatically reformed the sub-
stantive law of property by reducing the number of legal estates to two. In
the trustee for sale concept, this act provides a convenient vehicle for con-
veying title. These two developments make possible the operation of the
efficient, simple registration system established by the Land Registration
Act.
c. The Land Charges Act of 1925
Of all the land legislation of 1925, the Land Charges Act,5 7 now replaced
by the Land Charges Act of 1972,151 is likely the least successful. Ironically,
some of the judicial decisions upholding its broad purposes as to sanctity
of registration are better results than those flowing from the provisions of
the Land Registration Act.
Before 1925, no generally applicable recordation or registration system
was available to care for the wide variety of equitable interests possible in
realty. 5 9 Both the owners of these equitable estates, and the owners of the
153. Id. at 293.
154. Id.
155. Boland, [1980] 3 W.L.R. at 141.
156. Id. at 146.
157. Land Charges Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 22.
158. Land Charges Act, 1972, ch. 61.
159. See K. GRAY & P. Syaras, supra note 12, at 72-73.
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legal estates to which they pertained, were in an undesirably unstable posture.
The validity of the equitable interests against third-party purchasers of legal
estates depended entirely on ancient equity doctrines of fairness and notice. 6°
The nightmare of the equity owner was that the legal owner would transfer
the legal estate to a purchaser who would have no notice of the equitable
claim, thereby taking free of it. The nightmare of a purchaser was that a
legal title would be purchased by him with an equitable claim attached to
it that was not apparent and the existence of which he had no knowledge.
In such a case, the purchaser would have the burden of showing a purchase
in good faith and without knowledge.' 6' It is often difficult to prove a lack
of knowledge and, hence, neither party was in an entirely satisfactory position
prior to the 1925 legislation.
Virtually all protections of the Land Charges Act deal with equitable
interests. Only rare instances of provisions for the protection of a legal
interest, as in the case of a "puisne" mortgage, exist. 62 Nevertheless, the
Land Charges Act was not intended to provide protection for all equitable
interests, only for those broadly characterized as commercial interests and
specified in the six categories laid out in the Act itself. 6 The equitable
interests of the family variety'64 were protected by the mechanisms of the
Settled Land Act, the trust for sale provisions of the Law of Property Act,
and, of course, by the Land Registration Act when it applied.
The Land Charges Act has numerous shortcomings, but fails principally
for two reasons, both peculiarly pertinent to the major concerns of this
Article. First, the registration scheme is name-based, not tract-based, with
all the hazards this procedure entails. 6 Second, under post-1925 develop-
ments, a "root of title" search is limited to fifteen years,' 66 while a purchaser
is bound by any land charge registered since 1925.167 Because the purchaser
cannot require the seller to furnish names of titleholders prior to the time
root of title is established,' 6 and because a purchaser has no other feasible
way to obtain these names other than by chance, the purchaser is in the
position of not knowing what names on the register to search. He is bound,
however, by any registered claim on the land in those unknown names. This
lethal combination, a name index with no way of ascertaining the name,
has curtailed drastically the effectiveness of the Land Charges Act. Fortu-
160. See, e.g., Pilcher v. Rawlins, [1871-72] 7 Ch. App. 259, 266, 269 (1872).
161. See, e.g., In re Nisbet & Potts' Contract, [1906] 1 Ch. 386, 404, 409-10 (C.A.).
162. Land Charges Act §§ 2(4)(i), 3(3), 4(5), (7).
163. Id. § 2.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 75-96.
165. Ironically, at least as to the Land Charges Act, this shortcoming is common both to
registered conveyancing in England and Wales and to the present recordation systems in America.
166. Law of Property Act § 44(1), amended by Law of Property Act, 1969, ch. 59, § 23.
167. Id. § 4(3), (7), (8).
168. R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, supra note 6, at 609-10 (citing Law of Property Act § 45(1)).
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nately, as the Land Registration Act takes hold, the Land Charges Act is
reduced to irrelevancy.1 69
Nevertheless, the judicial interpretations of the Land Charges Act are of
particular importance to any adaptation of the British system to an American
context. Because these decisions under the Land Charges Act do not have
to be concerned with any overriding interests matters as in the Land Reg-
istration Act, 70 they often produce results more supportive of a credible
register than do decisions under the Land Registration Act on similar facts.1 71
The question Parliament considered in adopting all of the 1925 Acts was
the extent to which the registration of an interest, or its non-registration,
would supplant any inquiry into notice and fairness. 72 Parliament used what
appears to be quite clear language in setting out its intent. 73 Even such a
statement, however, was not sufficient to prevent the British Court of Ap-
peals, and especially Lord Denning, 74 from resurrecting the old concerns in
the much discussed case of Midland Bank v. Green. 75
Midland Bank turned on the extent to which a mother, holding legal title
to property, would be permitted to disregard her full knowledge of the
existence of an unregistered estate contract between her deceased husband
and her adult son. The mother declined to convey the property to the son
on the ground that she was not bound by the contract because it was
unregistered. The Court of Appeals could not bring itself to ignore the
mother's knowledge of the contract although admittedly the contract was
registerable under the Land Charges Act and had not been registered. All
parties conceded that the contract could have been registered by the son and
that if he had done so, the problem would not have arisen. Since the contract
was not registered, it would seem that the clear language of the Act would
render it void against the other children even though they had purchased
from the mother at an admittedly small consideration.
169. As the area of compulsory registration extends, the Land Charges Act will become
irrelevant since under Land Registration Act, § 59(2), the registration of a land charge against
registered land can be effected only by registering a notice, caution, or other prescribed entry
on the Charges Register which is then reflected on the Land Certificate. See Land Registration
Act § 63(1), (2).
Prior to the imposition of compulsory registration, purchasers of unregistered land had been
given protection against losses resulting from undiscoverable land charges through a claim on
the compensation fund. See supra note 11.
170. Under the Land Charges Act, if the charge is registerable but unregistered, a purchaser
takes free of it, and the rights of the owner of the charge against the land are defeated. Hence,
overriding interests are unnecessary. R. MEGARRY & H. WAE, supra note 6, at 170.
171. Compare Boland, [19801 3 W.L.R. 138 (decided under the Land Registration Act) with
Midland Bank Trust Co. v. Green, 1981 A.C. 513 (1980) (decided under the Land Charges
Act).
172. R. MEGARRY & H. VADE, supra note 6, at 185-86.
173. Id.
174. Midland Bank Trust Co. v. Green, 1980 Ch. 590, 619-25 (C.A. 1979).
175. Midland Bank, 1980 Ch. 590.
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The Court of Appeals relied on the basic unfairness of permitting one
who in fact knew of the contract to act in law as if she did not have that
knowledge. Thus, it permitted the son's executor to prevail over the claims
of the later purchasers. This result cut a huge swath through the credibility
of the registration system until the case was reversed by the House of Lords.
7 6
There, Lord Wilberforce restored the situation, at least as to the Land
Charges Act, to that which Parliament had intended. Lord Wilberforce took
the position that "good faith" was an irrelevant issue in the case. He
maintained that the legislation deliberately had omitted any consideration
of the absence or presence of good faith in the purchaser. 7 7 Further, he
was not impressed with the lower court's concern over whether the consid-
eration paid by the purchaser was adequate to classify him as a "purchaser"
within the meaning of the Act. 7 8 Since the claim was unregistered, the House
of Lords held it to be non-binding on the mother. 79 The case was regarded
as a significant victory for those seeking protection of the integrity of the
registration system and, therefore, for the orthodox view of the importance
of the protection of property titles, even at the expense of fairness.8 0
Since Midland Bank, the position has been strengthened that the test is
not to be one of notice or lack of notice of unregistered interests. The real
test is whether an interest is required to be registered to be given effect
against purchasers. If such a requirement exists, and has not been met, the
claim is void irrespective of notice.
A final evaluation of the Land Charges Act, therefore, shows that it is
severely flawed because it relies on a name-based, rather than a tract-based,
system. Since the Act was always intended as a temporary expedient, it will
soon become irrelevant as the Land Registration Act of 1925 continues to
cover more land transactions in England and Wales.
d. The Land Registration Act of 1925
The last of the English acts to be considered, and the one of most
immediate concern for purposes of this Article, is the Land Registration Act
of 1925."' This Act, together with the Law of Property Act,"' is the most
important of the 1925 property legislation. The expense of its implementation
coupled with the notable problems of the British nation since 1925 have
delayed, even until the present day, the full advantages that the Act promises.
176. Midland Bank Trust Co. v. Green, 1981 A.C. 513 (1980).
177. Id. at 529-30.
178. Id. at 531-32.
179. Id. at 527-28.
180. See K. GRAY & P. SymSs, supra note 12, at 126.
181. Land Registration Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 21.
182. Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 20.
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The Act's provisions are compulsory in those areas to which it has spread
and eventually will be compulsory throughout England and Wales. It is now
estimated that something over eighty per cent of the land in England and
Wales has been drawn within the network of registered land. It is also
estimated that the rest of the country will soon be covered by its provisions.8 3
Of course, not all land within the areas subject to registration is now
registered since in many instances no event has yet occurred that requires
an original registration."4
The Land Registration Act is ambitious because it purports to deal with
every conceivable estate or interest in land.'85 Also, the Act seeks to ex-
emplify, in its fullest sense, the "mirror principle," that is, an exact display
of the state of the title at any given moment. The Act also undertakes to
provide both a state-guaranteed title for proprietors and a proper scheme
of compensation for those improvidently harmed by the existence of that
title."16 The Act has failed to achieve totally any of these goals, in part
because of unnecessarily restrictive interpretations, and most importantly
because it contains within its provisions an Achilles heel known as "over-
riding interests.""17
i. Purposes of the Land Registration Act
Technically, the Land Registration Act of 1925 is structured to meet the
requirements of an effective system. The Act's stated purpose is that a
transferee for valuable consideration takes the legal title to an estate subject
to entries on the register and subject to overriding interests, but free from
all other estates and interests. 88 But for the ominous "overriding interests"
gap, the stated purpose would seem to confer on the register that absolute
"mirror" quality that any successful system must have to function as the
sole source of title status. The courts, however, have chipped away at the
conclusive nature of the register in a number of ways." 89 Similar facts lead
183. See supra note 91.
184. See supra note 92.
185. K. GRAY & P. Symms, supra note 12, at 320.
186. See 39 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 260 (1920) (remarks of Lord Chancellor Birkenhead
during debate on second reading of the Law of Property Bill); 154 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.)
91-100 (1922) (remarks of the Soliciter General, Sir Leslie Scott, during debate on second
reading of the Law of Property Bill).
187. Land Registration Act § 70.
188. See J. RmDALL, supra note 7, at 436 (citing Land Registration Act § 20(1)).
189. The courts have not allowed the register to lend efficacy to sham transactions. See
Jones v. Lipman, [19621 1 W.L.R. 832 (Ch. 1961) (vendor conveyed property to a company
he controlled in an unsuccessful attempt to defeat an unregistered contract); Ferris v. Weaven,
[1952] 2 All E.R. 233 (Q.B.) (consideration for purchase of land was never paid, vendor
continued to exercise ownership rights over the property, and thus, the purchaser was unable
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to different results in cases of registered and unregistered land, and this is
an undesirable situation.190 Admittedly, the terms of the Land Registration
Act itself often make for a different result in registered land than the Land
Charges Act would impose in unregistered land.191
Certainly, Parliament intended that the Land Registration Act would insure
that the register would be an extremely accurate "'mirror" of any interests
affecting registered land. 192 Section 20(1) of the Act provides that when there
is a disposition of a legal estate supported by consideration, the estate
transferred or created is free from all other estates and interests whatsoever. 193
Section 59(6) goes so far as to say that such a disposition shall mean that
the purchaser shall not "be concerned" with any matter not properly pro-
tected under the provisions of the register. 19 Parliament obviously meant to
impose a policy for registered land which was as rigorous as that which
pertained to unprotected land charges in unregistered land. 95
ii. Registration procedures
The workings of the registration and recordation structure are admirably
simple: one register is located in London and thirteen are in District Regis-
tries. 196 Each proprietorship register is based on an index card system. Each
registration is placed on an index card that is divided into three parts. The
first part designates the tract of land with reference to a plan or map showing
the land parcel. The second part describes the features of the title in terms
of quality, that is, absolute, good leasehold, qualified, or possessory. This
subdivision also lists the name and address of the registered proprietor and
sets out limitations. These limitations are known as cautions, inhibitions,
notices and the restrictions on proprietorship.'9 The third portion of the
card provides for entry of notice of rights adverse to the land, such as
to defeat the vendor's wife's right of occupation).
Another method of giving effect to registrable, but unregistered, interests is to imply an
economic tort action for inducing breach of contract when a purchaser takes free of the interest
under the Law of Property Act, yet had knowledge that his taking would induce breach. See
Sefton v. Tophams Ltd., 1965 Ch. 1140 (C-A.), rev'd, 11967] 1 A.C. 50 (no damage would
result). A third method is through permitting rectification of the register, as in Freer v. Unwins
Ltd., 1976 Ch. 288 (1975), when entry of a registered land charge was omitted upon first
registration of title.
190. Compare Caunce, [1969] 1 W.L.R. 286 with Boland, 11980] 3 W.L.R. 138.
191. See supra notes 170, 172 and accompanying text.
192. See Land Registration Act §§ 20(1), 59(6). See also K. GRAY & P. SYM s, supra note
12, at 321.
193. Land Registration Act § 20(1).
194. Id. § 59(6).
195. See Thompson, supra note 149, at 302.
196. Land Registration Act §§ 126(1), 132. See J. RIDDALL, supra note 7, at 421.
197. Land Registration Rules, 1925, r.6.
[Vol. 63:55
LAND TITLE REGISTRATION
easements, restrictive covenants and mortgages, as well as all other rights
defining and protecting rights over the land. 9 8
Since it is the land registration itself that is the title,'99 not the title deeds
as was formerly the case, a copy of the "land certificate," or the registration
document, is given to each registered proprietor.200 No transfer of the title
occurs until the registration actually takes place at the Register Office, 201
Because deeds in the American sense are no longer used to effect the transfer
of title, all the infirmities surrounding the use of deeds, such as improper
delivery, are avoided. This illustrates how the Act, which was designed and
intended to improve the conveyancing mechanism, has in fact had a much
wider impact in altering the basic law of property. The Act not only has
altered the time and manner in which title passes, it has changed other
fundamental concepts as well, such as the extent to which one can pass to
a purchaser a better title than one has.202
Because it is the act of registration that effectively passes title, it follows
that when registration is compulsory the registerable transaction is ineffective
to convey legal title until the registration occurs. In the case of a first
registration, such a transaction is void as to the legal estate unless the
registration occurs within two months,203 The Register office may extend this
time for "sufficient cause." 2 4 In the case of land already registered, the
grantor is said to hold the title on trust for the grantee until the registration
occurs, In this situation, the two-month limitation seemingly does not ap-
ply, 20s
iii. Interests which must be registered
The Land Registration Act provides that three classes of interests-"Reg-
istered Interests," "Overriding Interests," and "Minor Interests"-must be
registered. The first of these classes, the "Registered Interests," 2 6 are the
legal estates only, and in England this indicates either a legal fee simple
absolute or a term of years. The Act is much too complex and obfuscated
198. Id. r.7.
199. See Land Registration Act § 69.
200. Id, § 63(1),
201. Id. § 19(1).
202. See id. § 77.
203. See id. § 123(1).
204. Id,
205. See R. MEcARRY & H. WADE, supra note 6, at 200. See also Land Registration Act §§
19, 22.
206. Land Registration Act § 2 (stating that "legal estates shall be the only interests in land
, which . . . can be registered and all other interests . . . (except overriding interests and
interests entered on the register at or before such commencement) shall take effect in equity,"
but all non-legal interests "except undivided shares in land" can be handled by the Act).
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regarding the registration of leasehold estates and has been widely criticized
for this deficiency. 20 7
The second class, "Overriding Interests, '20 1 deals with rights which bind
the purchaser even though they do not appear on the register. Thus, these
rights override the register. This category includes legal easements, rights
relating to adverse possession, and most difficult and significant of all,
"rights of every person in actual occupation of the land or in receipt of the
rents and profits thereof, save where enquiry is made of such person and
the rights are not disclosed. ' 20 9 This provision has undercut dramatically the
philosophical underpinning of the 1925 legislation. The problem is so po-
tentially serious that, if left unattended, given the present drift of the House
of Lords on the matter, it may threaten the progress of the 1925 legislation
towards title security. 210 The reason is obvious. To the extent that one can
prevail on the basis of rights outside the register, the seeker of good title
must return to the dreary business of establishing who is or is not in
possession of the property, and who knows or should have known about
those claimed rights. 211
As noted earlier, registerable but unregistered land charges are offered
scant protection by the courts, thereby strengthening the Land Charges Act
207. See K. GRAY & P. SymEs, supra note 12, at 324-25; R. MEGARRY & H. VADE, supra
note 6, at 725-27; J. RIDDALL, supra note 7, at 425.
208. Land Registration Act §§ 3(xvi), 70, 71.
209. Id. § 70(1). See also R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, supra note 6, at 206-07 (explaining the
protection the Act affords to "equitable owners in possession [who] have not lodged cautions
or other entries in the register . . . and . . . [whose] occupation is not obvious to a purchaser"
(citations omitted)).
210. See Kingsnorth Trust Ltd. v. Tizard, [1986] 1 W.L.R. 783 (Ch. 1985).
211. The largest single reason for the failure of the Torrens system in the United States is
that judges could not bring themselves to uphold the title registration system in favor of one
who used the system against innocent people. Thus, courts went outside the registration system
to provide relief to those whose claims were not covered by the system. See, e.g., Eliason v.
Wilborn, 281 U.S. 457 (1930) (holding that owners of registered land, who entrusted their
certificate to another party who then forged a deed and obtained a new registered title in his
name which he subsequently conveyed, were not deprived of their property unconstitutionally
and that the bona fide purchasers were innocent grantees who obtained legal title to the
property); Echols v. Olsen, 63 Ill. 2d 270, 347 N.E.2d 720 (1976) (finding that a judgment
creditor did not hold a superior interest to a prior grantee, when pursuant to a divorce decree
a man delivered to his ex-wife a quitclaim deed surrendering his interest in registered property
originally owned by the two of them, but failed to register the deed; the judgment creditor
then recorded its lien on the original registration of title, but the court held that this did not
operate against the ex-wife); Chicago & Riverdale Lumber Co. v. Vellenga, 305 Ill. 415, 137
N.E. 212 (1922) (deciding that the Torrens act did not prohibit a subcontractor from seeking
to enforce a mechanic's lien against registered land even though the party engaging the sub-
contractor had not recorded his deed and subsequently conveyed the property to a third party
who registered his deed with no indication of the lien).
This same attitude now threatens to diminish the effectiveness of the English registration
system. This author advocates adhering strictly to the registration system and compensating
innocent victims from the insurance fund.
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by according a high degree of credibility to its registration requirement. 212
One who owns any registerable, equitable interest in unregistered land under
the Land Charges Act risks everything by not registering it. Further, as in
Caunce,2 3 a lender need not inquire as to the nature of the interest of a
spouse in occupation of unregistered land. In stark contrast, the registerable
but unregistered interest in registered land under the Land Charges Act may
very well be protected as an overriding interest in cases in which the interest
enjoys dual status. 214 These rights may be in the nature of estate contracts
or an option to purchase a freehold in an occupying lease,2 5 but they can
take a wider variety of forms and may not always be apparent to a potential
purchaser. 216
One of the most difficult situations is that of spouses occupying property
as tenants in common. Because this sort of tenancy now cannot exist at
law, it can take effect only behind a trust. As in the Caunce217 and Boland2l8
cases, this situation often arises in the case of a wife who has in fact made
a contribution to the purchase of the family home, but the title to the
property has been taken in the name of the husband only. Here, the Law
of Property Act has been interpreted to imply a trust for sale with the
husband deemed a trustee for the benefit of both himself and his wife.21 9
Despite the fact that under the doctrine of conversion the wife's interest is
regarded as personalty for many purposes, it is nonetheless regarded as "an
interest subsisting in reference to land" to -bring it within the overriding
interests category of the Land Registration Act.20
In 1983, Parliament enacted the Matrimonial Homes Act, 221 providing for
a statutory "right of occupation" in a spouse in certain situations. The
Land Registration Act of 1925, however, refuses to grant an overriding
212. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
213. Caunce, [1969] 1 W.L.R. 286.
214. Any interest in land that is not a registered interest or an overriding interest is a minor
interest pursuant to Land Registration Act § 3(xv). Protection of minor interests requires making
an entry on the register. However, minor interests include a spouse's right of occupation of
the matrimonial home.
Since the rights of persons in actual occupation of land are overriding interests under Land
Registration Act § 70(1)(g), it is possible that a wife in actual occupation of a matrimonial
home, who fails to enter her minor interest on the register, may still prevail over subsequent
purchasers because her interest enjoys dual status as both a minor interest and an overriding
interest. See K. GRAY & P. SymEs, supra note 12, at 342-45; J. RIDDALL, supra note 7, at 427-
32.
215. See Land Registration Act § 70(1)(g), (h).
216. Overriding interests include easements not required to be protected through registration,
liability to repair highways originating in tenure, liability to repair the chancel of any church,
and liability with respect to embankments, and river and sea walls. Id. § 70(1)(a)-(d).
217. Caunce, [1969] 1 W.L.R. 286.
218. Boland, [1980] 3 W.L.R. 138.
219. Waller, [1967] 1 W.L.R. at 453.
220. Boland, [1980] 3 W.L.R. 138.
221. Matrimonial Homes Act, 1983, ch. 19.
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interest to a spouse who acquired rights under the Matrimonial Homes Act.
Nevertheless, she may still be a person in occupation and own an overriding
interest by reason of her status as an equitable tenant in common.22 The
matrimonial right of occupation can be registered as a minor interest by an
appropriate entry of notice, 224 but even if it is not so registered, the wife
may still prevail. If she is in occupation and has an equitable property right
by reason of a contribution to the property, this right has status as an
overriding interest that saves the wife's claim. 22 This variety of claim par-
ticularly is a trap for the conveyancer because nothing visible suggests that
the reason for the wife's occupation is anything other than the spousal
relationship. 226
Several cases illustrate the frustrations of the overriding interests prob-
lem. 227 The most important of these in recent times is Williams & Glyn's
Bank Ltd. v. Boland,2 in which the court both protected the wife's tenancy
in common interest and seemed to restate emphatically the sanctity of the
register and the irrelevancy of matters extraneous to it. This very important
case has caused much comment and controversy in England, for it seems
to open wide the question of what sort of "actual occupation" can constitute
an overriding interest under the registration act. 229 The case involved the
claim of a wife as a beneficial party under a trust for sale, but the fact of
the marriage seemed irrelevant to the principle established by the case. The
legal title to the property was registered in the name of the husband only
and nothing on the register suggested the wife's interest. The House of Lords
held, nevertheless, that a bank lending money on the property had an
obligation to inquire about the nature of the claim on the property by the
wife in actual occupation. 2 0
222. See id. § 1(11).
223. See, e.g., K. GRAY & P. Syims, supra note 12, at 355 (indicating that a wife's "beneficial
interest [as a tenant in common] behind the trust for sale . .. qualifies for protection as a
minor interest in registered land"); R. MEGARRY & H. WADn, supra note 6, at 206, 208-09
(discussing the court's holding in Boland that a wife in occupation of a home with her husband
had an overriding interest as a tenant in common).
224. See Land Registration Act § 103.
225. See supra note 176 and accompanying text,
226. Presumably, if a prospective purchaser or mortgagee inspects the property and either
does or does not discover persons in occupation other than the registered owner, he must still
inquire as to the owner's marital status, the relationship between the owner and any persons
found in occupation, and the source of funds utilized to acquire the property.
227. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Marks, 1971 Ch. 892 (C.A.); National Provincial Bank Ltd. v,.
Hastings Car Mart Ltd., 1964 Ch. 665 at 689, (C.A.), rev'd sub nom. National Provincial
Bank Ltd. v. Ainsworth, 1965 A.C. 1175; London & Cheshire Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Laplagrene
Property Co. Ltd., 1971 Ch. 499 (1970); Webb v. Pollmount Ltd., 1966 Ch. 584 (1965); Bridge
v. Mees, 1957 Ch. 475.
228. Poland, [1980] 3 W.L.R. 138.
229. See, e.g., K. GRAY & P. Symas, supra note 12, at 361-85 (discussing the changes created
by the court's interpretation of "actual occupation" in Boland and the resulting implications
of a broader definition).
230. Boland, [1980] 3 W.L.R. at 147.
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As stated, the fact that the person in actual occupation was a spouse is
not essential to the Boland holding. If a mistress, a cohabitee, or perhaps
just anyone who had at some time made a contribution to the purchase
price or to improvements on the property were in actual occupation, the
result might have been the same.231 The situation is not clear and the enhanced
risk to purchasers is obvious.
The Act's third category of rights in registered land is known as "minor
interests." 2' 2 The interests protected here can be inserted into the register
through notice, a caution, an inhibition, or a restriction. 233 Sometimes more
than one of these vehicles is available to meet the needY 4
The array of rights protectable under this category includes restrictive
covenants25 (enforceable only in equity in England), estate contracts23 6 and,
very importantly, rights such as family and other interests which fall either
behind a trust under the Settled Land Act,217 or behind a trust for sale under
the Law of Property Act.21s These rights are protected by putting a purchaser
on notice that the prescribed procedures in the Settled Land Act or the trust
for sale sections must be observed if there is to be an overreaching of the
private arrangements under their provisions. 9
Peffer v. Rigg24O involved an unregistered "minor interest" in registered
land. In Peffer, a person who had undisputed actual knowledge of an
unregistered claim sought the benefit of the register. The person having the
knowledge proved to be free of the claim. The court dealt, in part, with
whether the claimant was in fact a "purchaser" within the meaning of the
Act given the nature of the consideration advanced. More importantly, the
court suggested that if the claimant tried to take advantage of the other
party's failure to use the machinery of the Act, he could not do so because
23 1. See K. GRAY & P. Sno-ms, supra note 12, at 301-02 (asserting that the marital relationship
was not the crucial factor in Boland, rather it was that joint property rights were at issue, and
"ultimately a social calculus [will decidel the issue" of to whom these rights extend).
232. Land Registration Act §§ 101-103, 105.
233. Id. § 101(3). See also id. §§ 48-62 (describing in detail the use of notices, cautions,
inhibitions, and restrictions).
234. See, e.g., K. GRAY & P. Svaras, supra note 12, at 326 (explaining, for example, that
commercial equitable interests in registered land can be entered on the Land Register by use
of either a notice on the Charges Register or a caution on the Proprietorship Register). For
detailed information on the various uses of these protections, see Land Registration Act, §§
48-62.
235. Id. §§ 40, 50.
236. Id. § 70(1)(f), (g), construed in Bridges, 1957 Ch. 475.
237. See J. RmDAuIL, supra note 7, at 428; Land Registration Act, § 3(xv).
238. See 1. RinoDsi, supra note 7, at 428.
239. Hence, if a purchaser fails to pay the purchase money to the trustees of the settlement
or trustees for sale, his purchase will fail to overreach the equitable interests of the beneficiaries.
See id.
240. Peffer v. Rigg, [19771 1 W.L.R. 285 (Ch. 1976).
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he was not a "purchaser in good faith" in that he had actual knowledge
of the other party's interest. 241
This result has been widely criticized as contrary to the purposes of the
Land Registration Act.242 In Peffer, it seems that old equity principles were
reintroduced and permitted to supersede Parliament's instruction. This case
confuses the law regarding the failure to protect a minor interest by entering
it on the register. What it seems to hold is that one who purchases with
notice cannot rely on the registered title. Perhaps the broader question is
whether reliance on legal rights may ever constitute fraudulent conduct.
Those who have sought to diminish the right to reliance on the register have
suggested that circumstances exist in which such reliance can be the basis
of fraud. 4 3 These persons have supported this contention with the equitable
maxim that a statute cannot be used as an instrument of fraud.244
An excellent article by Thompson assesses this approach and the conse-
quential dangers to the fundamentals of the Act. Thompson concludes that
the English always have tended not to give effect to clear provisions of
registration statutes2 45 He suggests that this has been done either through
the Peffer v. Rigg route, or, more recently, through indirect means such as
theories of economic torts, personal actions for complicity in breach of trust,
and actions for rectification of the register. 246
Maintaining close control of collateral attacks on the registration system
is a matter of first importance to the integrity of the register. If courts are
allowed to introduce equitable principles to override the obvious intent of
the legislature, then the Land Registration Act may be inadequate to fulfill
its purpose. American jurisdictions should pay close attention to the issue
of legislative intent and to the possibility of future collateral attack of
registration legislation when they take steps to reform current American
practice.
iv. Entries on the register necessary to protect interests
Some four types of entries are available for the protection of specified
minor interests under the Land Registration Act. Generally, the first entry,
called "notice," 24 is used to enter "friendly" matters on the register because
the notice can be entered only on production of the land certificate by the
owner.24s This strange provision means that if the owner does not wish the
241. Id. at 294.
242. K. GRAY & P. Symms, supra note 12, at 330; Thompson, supra note 149, at 285.
243. See K. GRAY & P. Syms, supra note 12, at 300.
244. See id. at 280.
245. See Thompson, supra note 149, at 280-85.
246. Id.
247. See Land Registration Act §§ 48-52 (statutory sections on the use of restrictions).
248. Id. § 64(1).
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particular entry to be made on the certificate, he simply can refuse to produce
it. Two types of interests that might be the subject of a notice are restrictive
covenants and estate contracts.
A second entry, the "restriction, " 2A9 is another of the "friendly" variety
of registrations and in that sense it is more akin to the notice entry than to
the caution or the inhibition entries discussed below. Often the proprietor
will want to enter the restriction, as in the case of the trustee for sale who
desires to put prospective purchasers on notice that the land is held on trust
for sale, and dealings with the property must therefore comport with statutory
requirements relating to that status. 250
The next type of entry, "cautions, "251 takes two forms: one that pertains
to first registration and another that pertains to dealings with land already
registered. Both forms are intended to enable the cautioner, a person "in-
terested" in the land but one whose interest is neither registered nor the
subject of a notice, to receive notification of intended transactions involving
the land. If so notified, the cautioner must then be prepared to protect his
interest within the quite limited time provided.252 Functionally, the caution
provides a means for those who are unable to file a notice to protect their
claim. Equitable easements or options to purchase are possible subjects of
a caution. 253
The means of last resort to protect one's interest is an "inhibition ' 254
which is an order obtained from a court or the registrar to forbid dealings
with the land in question for a period of time or until some specified event.
Together, these four types of entries protect certain interests because the
transferee takes legal title subject to what is entered on the register.
v. Provisions for secrecy
A feature of the Land Registration Act, inconsistent with an ideal system
and incomprehensible except as a by-product of history, is the Act's preoc-
cupation with confidentiality. 25 If the information on a register is more
open, it is more likely that the system will work as intended in conveying
notice. As a general matter, however, subject to a few exceptions such as
249. See id. § 58 (statutory section on the use of restrictions).
250. See R. MEoARRY & H. WADE, supra note 6, at 215 (explaining the rationale for the
use of restrictions).
251. See Land Registration Act §§ 53-56 (statutory sections on the use of cautions).
252. See Land Registration Rules, rr.67, 218 (limiting the time period to fourteen days).
253. See Land Registration Act § 101(3) (stating that minor equitable interests can be protected
by entering cautions on the register).
254. See id. § 57 (statutory section on the use of inhibitions).
255. See id. § 112, amended by Administration of Justice Act, 1975, § 67(1); Land Registration
Rules, r.12. See also K. GRAY & P. Syzms, supra note 12, at 323; R. MEGARRY & H. WADE,
supra note 6, at 1152-53.
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a court order for obtaining information for limited purposes,256 the register
may not be examined by anyone without permission of the registered owner. 7
Means exist to ascertain whether a tract of land has been registered at alI,2 8
but basically, and totally unlike the American recordation system, the land
register is not a public document.
Perhaps in practice this aspect of the system is not as onerous as it appears
to be. When a purchaser is involved, the statute requires the proprietor to
give the purchaser access to the register in order to confirm the seller's
representations about what appears on the register.259 In the case of mort-
gages, the money will not be lent until permission to search is given by the
mortgagor. ° Less leverage, however, is available for lessees, and though
they will be bound by the many possible limitations which an examination
of the register would reveal, they have no right to inspect in the absence of
the proprietor's permission. 26'
Any American adaptation should dispense with the secrecy provisions.
The better thinking in England today is that no logically sound reason
requires this excessive privacy and that these features should be modified. 2
Dispensing with the secrecy provisions will ensure that all interested parties
will have easy and ready access to the registration documents.
vi. Absoluteness versus the right to rectification
Any evaluation of the English acts must consider the costs and benefits
of the provisions for amending the land title register. It can be said that if
the goals of a title registration act are met, the registered title owner has,
as nearly as possible for any system, a title that is absolute and guaranteed
as such by the state. In fact, this concept of guaranteed absolute title is
considerably watered down in the English version when one considers the
amendability aspects of the register. The English call this procedure for
amendment "rectification. ' 26 Any American adaptation should weigh care-
256. The Land Registration Act, § 112(2)(b)(i), allows the High Court to authorize inspection
or copying the register if it contains information that is relevant to a pending proceeding,
including a proceeding for the enforcement of any court's judgment. Likewise, section 112(3)
allows a country court the same powers. Further, section 112(2)(b)(ii) grants authority to the High
Court to order inspection or to copy the register if it appears that such order ought to be made
for any other reason.
257. The Land Registration Act, § 112(1), provides that only the registered proprietor of
any land or charge, or any person authorized by him, by court order, or by general rule
shall have a right to inspect and copy the register.
258. See Land Registration Rules, r.12.
259. Land Registration Act § 110(1).
260. See K. GRAY & P. SyMEs, supra note 12, at 531.
261. See K. GRAY & P. SysmEs, supra note 12, at 324-25; R. MEcARRY & H. WADE, supra
note 6, at 727.
262. See, e.g., R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, supra note 6, at 1152.
263. Land Registration Act § 82.
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fully a system as broadly subject to amendment as that in England, and
should consider a more restrictive approach.
In principle, any successful system must provide means of amendment
under proper circumstances. Even as successful a document as our Consti-
tution succeeded in part because it is amendable as necessary. Nonetheless,
as a corollary principle, the Constitution has succeeded because it is so
difficult to amend, and because it has yielded so rarely to amendment. A
registered land system must be similar.
The critical point is that the easier it is to amend a registration, the less
credible the registration, and the more likely it is that those who have relied
on the sanctity of the certificate will be put at risk. A system with no
provision for amendment is unreasonable and unacceptable. Yet a system
amendable virtually at will or on the caprice of an official is equally un-
workable. The English rectification procedures fall between the extremes,
but these procedures err somewhat on the side of being too easily rectified.
Clearly, they reflect a more liberal view of amendment than that found in
other jurisdictions employing similar registration notions. 264
The problem of ease of rectification is linked to the problem of access to
the fund provided for pecuniary compensation for certain losses. While the
possible bases of rectification are wide ranging, the access to the compen-
satory fund is too limited. 26 The provisions should be the other way around;
access to rectification should be stingily granted, and access to a broadly
available and fully funded source of financial compensation should be granted
generously.
The breadth of rectification has found favor with some British authori-
ties, 266 in good part because of the high competency of the Registrars, whose
control of rectification is quite extensive. Such a delegation of discretion
may be justified in England where the professionalism of the Registrars is
commendable. Given the American experience with wide variation in quality
and competence of some county guardians of land related records, the same
broad grant of power would be a mistake here.
C. Assessing King George's 1925 Legislation
From the long English experience, valuable conclusions are possible about
what has worked and what has not worked in the area of title assurance.
Unquestionably, the acts have been a huge overall success in achieving most
of what they were intended to achieve. 267 It is equally certain, however, that
264. See R. MEGARRY & H. VADE, supra note 6, at 227.
265. See Land Registration Act § 83. Limited access results in many being denied relief.
266. See, e.g., R. MEGARRY & H. NVADE, supra note 6, at 227.
267. See supra note 9.
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they need revision. 268 The American advantage is that of the blank page. A
jurisdiction considering reform is free to consider either a fresh start, or
perhaps a modification of the system presently in place. Which should it
be?
The contemporary American quest for title assurance is unsatisfactory
because it is expensive, full of duplication, and propped up by the concerns
of various special interests. 269 The focus of our system should be the well-
being of the property purchaser. It is, instead, too often the preserve of
those who profit from its artificial complexities. 270
The existing system can be improved, and impressive on-going efforts are
underway to do so. Statutory forms of deed warranties, 27' with generally
predictable consequences in their use, somewhat enhance this old safeguard.
The recording system itself is being made measurably more efficient in many
areas by the establishment of tract indexes. 272 Other improvements are emerg-
ing. For instance, sometimes more elaborate mapping of counties takes place
to assure more standardized descriptions of property,273 and a better con-
268. See supra note 9.
269. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 33-50 and accompanying text.
271. Many states have enacted statutes specifically addressing deed warranties and covenants
of title. These statutes generally elaborate on the meaning of the covenants. See, e.g., GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 44-5-60 to -62 (1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:4-3 to -10 (West 1940); N.Y. REAL
PROP. LAW § 253 (McKinney 1968). In addition, some statutes provide for) the recovery of
damages when a warranty is breached. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3304 (West 1970); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 27-1-316 (1985).
Many states also allow the use of short forms of conveyances, some of which imply the
inclusion of, and others not inferring any, covenants of title. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE 1113
(West 1970) (indicating that "the use of the word 'grant' in any conveyance" implies the
existence of the right to convey and the covenant against encumbrances); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 183, § 10 (West 1977) (stating that a "Warranty Deed" form includes the covenant
of seisin, the covenant against encumbrances, the covenant of the right to convey, and the
covenant of warranty). But cf. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 183, § 12 (West 1977) (stating that
the use of the word "grant" is "a sufficient word of conveyance ... [but] no covenant shall
be implied from the use of the word 'grant' "); R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-11-26 (1956) (indicating
that "the word 'grant' shall be a sufficient word of conveyance ... [but implies] no covenant
or warranty").
272. See J. CRIBBET, supra note 21, at 329 (asserting that a system of tract indexing "is
clearly superior" to a grantor-grantee index system, and use of a tract system leads to greater
efficiency in the recording system).
273. Many scholars regard tract indexing as superior to the use of a grantor-grantee index
system. Use of a tract index system simplifies a title search because it not only describes the
particular property but also provides information about all transactions affecting the parcel of
land. One advantage of a tract index over a grantor-grantee index is that instruments outside
the chain of title are easily discoverable on the tract index, whereas such instruments are not
apparent on the face of the grantor-grantee index. Another reason to prefer the use of a tract
index is to decrease problems associated with the misspelling of a grantor's or grantee's name
on the index. See Note, The Tract and Grantor-Grantee Indices, 47 Iowa L. REv. 481, 482,
486-88, 493-95 (1962). See also Cross, The Record "Chain of Title" Hypocrisy, 57 COLUM. L.
REv. 786, 799-800 (1957) (explaining the advantage of the use of tract indexes in regard to
chain of title problems); Fairchild, Improvement in Recording and Indexing Methods for Real
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sensus of the time frame required for an adequate title search is emerging. 274
To effect improvements, several developments still must occur. For instance,
it is essential that the pertinent records are housed centrally and more
efficiently, just as title factories have done. Also, widespread adoption of
some of the proposed uniform laws on marketable title and simplified land
transfer may be a proper response to many problems. 275 Abolishing a great
many county governments with the consequent centralization of record-
keeping authority and efficiency would be an excellent step, but this is
probably beyond the political realities of today.
In the end, all of these steps would produce a better system, yet one still
fundamentally inept and inadequate to handle the needs of modern life.
Conservative measures are not enough. What is needed is surgery. If, then,
the move is to be towards comprehensive, major reform, American juris-
dictions must be highly selective in what they take from the modern English
legislation. The models are available, and for the most part, they work. The
case law is adequate, and in general, it addresses sensibly the gaps in leg-
islation that have become apparent in the decades since the basic enact-
ments. 276 From the models themselves and an examination of how they have
worked, one may conclude specifics about the acts.
First, the provisions of the Settled Land Act 277 concerning successive own-
ership and conveyancing are original and fascinating in design, but they have
proven clumsy in practice. As it exists in England, this Act can be disregarded
as inappropriate for our purposes here. All of its stated major purposes
have been met by the widely used and more functional trust for sale technique
of the Law of Property Act.?8 Nevertheless, at least one provision of the
Settled Land Act deserves close scrutiny. The concept of the "tenant for
Property Instruments, 28 GEo. L.J. 307 (1939) (advocating the use of tract indexes); McCormick,
Possible Improvements in the Recording Acts, 31 W. VA. L.Q. 79 (1925) (arguing for imple-
mentation of land-based indexes rather than name-based indexes).
In spite of the enumerated advantages of a tract index system, a majority of jurisdictions
employ a grantor-grantee index system or use the two systems in combination. See Note, supra,
at 481-83.
274. At common law, the period of time that a title search had to cover was fifty to sixty
years. The time period has been decreased, however, to thirty to fifty years in states that have
adopted marketable title acts. See D. BURKE, JR., supra note 45, at 360.
The Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act provides that a marketable title, i.e., a
record title extinguishing any claims prior to the effective date of the root of title, is established
by an unbroken chain of title for thirty years or more. See UrNiF. Si MPLIcATIoN OF LAND
TRANSFEas ACT §§ 3-301, 3-302, 14 U.L.A. 253-54 (1980).
275. See, e.g., UNIF. LAND TRANSAcTioNs ACT, 13 U.L.A. 469 (1986); Ur.F. SIMPLIFICATION
OF LAND TRANsFERs ACT, 14 U.L.A. 209 (1980 & Supp. 1987).
276. See J. RiDDALL, supra note 7, at 460.
277. Settled Land Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 18.
278. As a result of the complexities of dealing under the Settled Land Act, as well as the
adverse tax consequences flowing from a strict settlement, the trust for sale device has almost
totally displaced it. See supra notes 73, 99-102.
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life, ' 27 9 as titleholder of the legal fee simple estate and with wide-ranging
powers to deal with the estate, is an appealing one. Perhaps this is because,
as the drafters of the Act imagined, the tenant for life is a person obviously
situated to deal with the property and the one with whom third parties
naturally would expect to deal. An American statute should heed this in-
novative and useful concept, stripped of the clumsiness and other disadvan-
tages attached to it in England. Some combination or melding of the role
of the tenant for life with the role of the trustee for sale might be useful.
The next act to consider is the Land Charges Act.20 Just as the Settled
Land Act, as it exists in England today, need not be of much concern in
an evaluation of the importance of the English legislation, so also the Land
Charges Act, in and of itself, is of little concern.2' As discussed above, the
Land Charges Act was a temporary expedient, even in England. It was
necessary there because of the lack of any general recordation system for
equitable interests prior to 1925. Some means had to be developed to deal
with these interests under the new system pending the arrival of the Land
Registration Act 282 in all areas of the country. Since equitable interests are
broadly recordable under existing American systems, there is no need here
for a similar transitional act. Still, the Land Charges Act holds valuable
lessons for an American audience regarding the manner in which British
courts have chosen to give high credibility to the charges register.u3 Beyond
that, all of the Act's more important purposes are subsumed into the more
complete and more sophisticated Land Registration Act.
This third Act, the Land Registration Act,28 is not a perfect vehicle for
American needs, but provides a model that, as modified on the basis of
English experience, can be adapted for a vastly improved system here.
Necessary changes include improvements in the procedure and philosophy
of rectification and secrecy, as well as a more realistic method of handling
lease registration.285 The Land Registration Act, nevertheless, provides the
basic model and it could well provide the essentials of a workable system
here.
Finally, the Law of Property Act must be considered. 2 6 This act, the
central legislation of all the 1925 reforms, provides elements critical to the
success of the overall program. Those elements provide for reducing the
number of legal estates to two, reducing the number of possible concurrent
279. The tenant for life is the person who is entitled to possession of the land at any given
time. See supra note 69.
280. Land Charges Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 22.
281. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
282. Land Registration Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 21.
283. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
284. Land Registration Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 21.
285. See supra notes 257, 263, 267 and accompanying text.
286. Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 20.
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legal estates to one,2 and creating the trust for sale as a method for owning
legal title and transferring it.283 These reforms are vital to the English scheme,
and they would prove invaluable in an American reform. Much can be
adapted in a United States system from the Law of Property Act.
IV. CONSTRUCTION OF A NEw A3mucAN SYSTEM
OF TiTLE ASSURANCE
Clearly, an American scheme of title assurance reform can benefit in
major ways by adopting both philosophies and procedures worked out and
tested in Britain. No wholesale, or "as is," adoption is desirable. If starting
again, the British themselves might do it somewhat differently. 289 What is
suggested as appropriate is to incorporate into an American reform effort
the broad strengths and themes of the best of the English acts. The principal
theme is simplicity and certainty. The broad strengths of the legislation
following on those basics are (i.) comprehensive legislation "clearing the
decks" for a truly workable and reliable assurance system, and (ii.) the
creation, made possible by (i.), of a secure registration system which meets
within its parameters all of the title assurance needs of any transferee.
A. Designing a Workable System in the United States
To meet the requirements of creating a workable and reliable assurance
scheme, a matter of first priority is that the substantive property law must
be reformed to assure that the number of permissible legal estates is drast-
ically reduced. The English have been successful in reducing the number to
two such estates with recognition of comparable legal "interests." No dis-
cernable policy or practical reason exists why the same reform could not be
effective here. Similarly, the English abolished the concurrent legal estates
in property, other than joint tenancy, and this has been singularly effective
in simplifying the substantive law. The several concurrent legal estates that
are possible in most American jurisdictions complicate considerably and
unnecessarily the search for secure title.290 A reduction to a single permitted
form of concurrent legal ownership would have the same beneficial effect
here that it has had in England.
Finally, the provision of a much restricted arrangement for the holding
of legal title to land held on successive estates and for land owned concur-
rently is essential to the goal of title security. In an earlier age in which
land ownership signified uniqueness and was near sanctity because of its
287. See supra notes-75-76 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 134-45 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 12.
290. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
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importance as a form of wealth ownership, these changes would have been
unthinkable. Today is a time when wealth most often takes a form other
than legal ownership of land. Therefore, when the money flowing from the
land's sale can be at least as valuable an item as the land in its original
form, no reason exists for restricting land ownership to advance other goals,
such as easy conveyancing and easy title security. Once the preliminary work
of substantive reform has been achieved, the benefits of that reform can be
woven into a successful registration program.
The general outline of the English registration act should serve well as
the basis for American legislation. Those provisions that enhance the theme
of sanctity of registered title should be adopted and enhanced. Those pro-
visions, such as the "overriding interests" categories, 291 that cut the other
way should be evaluated skeptically and avoided when this can be done
reasonably. The emphasis on a "just" result in hard cases should be on the
use of the compensatory fund, not on a dilution of the mirror quality of
registered title. Similarly, rectification of the register should be discouraged
in favor of appropriate compensations from the fund. In England, where
the notion of rectification has been favorably received and where registrars
are granted broad discretion in its use, a highly competent group of profes-
sional registrars have evolved. 29 2 Delegation to such professionals makes more
sense there than here, where wide variation in the quality and competence
of county guardians of land records justifies less confidence in their use of
broad discretion. Obviously, too, the extent to which the register can be
altered subsequent to the registration bears on the confidence one can have
in the system regardless of who makes the rectification. 29 3
A second modification of the English act should deal with the provisions
for registering leases. 294 British conveyancers have long utilized what seem
to be extraordinarily long leases to achieve various purposes.295 Most likely,
the preservation of the term of years as one of the two retained legal estates
possible is a recognition of both the importance of the lease and the inap-
propriateness of its use within the trust structure in many commercial settings.
This is understandable as a measure of the importance placed on the lease
in a society in which fee simple ownership was so long regarded as the basis
of enduring wealth, and the long-term lease served that purpose. At the
same time, the long-term lease permitted the owner to benefit from the
income from the property.296 The Land Registration Act makes intricate and
291. Land Registration Act § 70.
292. The Land Register is controlled by the Chief Land Registrar, who is appointed by the
Lord Chancellor. Id. § 126(1). See also K. GRAY & P. SYMEs, supra note 12, at 322.
293. See supra notes 263-66 and accompanying text.
294. Land Registration Act §§ 8-12.




obtuse distinctions in leasehold registrations, usually based on the duration
of the lease. 297 Hence, some leases must be registered, some cannot be
registered, and others may be registered optionally. 29 8 The result is more
snare than utility and these provisions have proven to be an unpopular
feature of the legislation. 2
99
Finally, the excessive secrecy aspects of the Registration Act3°° serve no
real purpose and should not be part of an American act. Beyond these
deficiencies, the Land Registration Act exists as a viable mechanism from
which American reformers can borrow liberally. Nevertheless, it is uncertain
whether such a system will succeed or win support in the United States.
B. Will the English System Work in the United States?
One of Professor John Chipman Gray's fundamental propositions on the
Rule Against Perpetuities is that one first decides whether the Rule applies,
and if it does apply, then "the rule is to be remorselessly applied." 0' That
is, the application is without regard to what may be wrought among the
interests affected. This principle of "remorseless application" has proven
difficult for American courts in perpetuities matters. 30 2 The reason is un-
derstandable. Such a rule results in some very hard cases indeed. 0 3 The
297. See Land Registration Act § 19(2)(a). See also J. RIDDAIL, supra note 7, at 424.
298. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
299. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 255-62 and accompanying text.
301. J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUIS § 629 (4th ed. 1942).
302. Courts often have been faced with clear violations of the Rule Against Perpetuities,
but have refused to enforce the rule. Depending on the particular situation, various explanations
have been given. For example, in Forman v. Troup, 30 Ga. 496 (1860), the court tried to
explain its rationale for finding gifts under the late Governor Troup's will to be valid by
differentiating between fee simple and fee tail gifts. In the end though, the court stated that
"of all men .... [the court] never would ... impute such an intention to violate the laws of
... [Georgia] to a man who loved her, and every letter of her laws, and every inch of her
soil with an energy and devotion that no soul could inspire but that of George M. Troup."
Id. at 499.
Similarly, in Colt v. Industrial Trust Co., 50 R.I. 242, 146 A. 628 (1929), some of the
testator's heirs sought to invalidate a trust because it violated the Rule Against Perpetuities.
The court interpreted the language of the will so that it would not violate the Rule and asserted
that the testator "was a member of the bar of this state for many years and was Attorney
General for several years... [Ilt is presumed that he knew of the rule against perpetuities and
... would not knowingiy make a will attempting to dispose of his property in violation of
that rule." 50 R.I. at 246, 146 A. at 630. See also In re Bassett's Estate, 104 N.H. 504, 190
A.2d 415 (1963) (rejecting the common-law conclusive presumption that men or women of any
age or physical condition can bear children, and deciding that the Rule Against Perpetuities is
not violated when the likelihood of children being born to a beneficiary is "negligible").
303. Remorseless application of the Rule has spawned several rigid results, some of which
may not have been intended by testators or which may not seem sensible. Two examples of
these strict interpretations are:
a. the case of the fertile octogenarian, see, e.g., Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox. 324, 325, 29 Eng.
1987]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
reluctance to give effect to Gray's directive has spawned many reform efforts
in the field of perpetuities. 3°4 Yet each has its own cost. Gray's solution had
the indisputable advantage of early resolution of perpetuities problems. The
"Wait and See" reform may save some otherwise void dispositions, but it
requires that one "wait to see" what happens, and sometimes for a long
period of time. "Cy Pres" reforms require the grant to tribunals of wide
powers to rewrite wills and deeds, sometimes to the point of unrecogniza-
bility.
Problems of title security present an obvious analogy to problems of
perpetuities. No doubt the reluctance, indeed refusal, of some American
courts to abandon old equity notice rules in favor of a highly credible
registration system contributed much to the failure of early Torrens system
efforts in this country. 05 The English too have had difficulties in abandoning
Rep. 1186, 1187 (1787) (holding that the testator violated the Rule Against Perpetuities because
the interest given to the Jee's issue was not valid at the time of its creation, even though the
Jees were well past child-bearing age, and stating that the court was not "at liberty . . . to
suppose it impossible for persons in so advanced an age to have children"), and
b. the case of the unborn widow, see, e.g., Loring v. Blake, 98 Mass. 253 (1867) (finding
that the testatrix' gift of trust income to the husband or wife of any of her children on her
child's death was void because of the possibility that one of her children could marry someone
who was not in being at the time of her death and this person could survive the testatrix'
child).
Another facet of the Rule that creates hard cases is the requirement of certainty of vesting
within the required time. See, e.g., In re Campbell's Estate, 28 Cal. App. 2d 102, 82 P.2d 22
(1938) (affirming an order that a testamentary gift was invalid because of lack of certainty
that it would vest in the legatees within the statutorily required time); In re LaTouf's Will, 87
N.J. Super. 137, 208 A.2d 411 (1965) (deciding that the fertile octogenarian rule did not bar
a testamentary gift, but that the lack of certainty of vesting within twenty-one years plus lives
in being resulted in an invalid gift).
304. To avoid the harshness of the Rule Against Perpetuities, many jurisdictions have mod-
ified the rule, either by statute or case law. Among the reform efforts are:
a. extending the time period for vesting of an interest, see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODES 715.6
(West 1982) (stating that an interest "which must vest, if at all, not later than 60 years after
[its] creation" does not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities); and,
b. "wait and see"-waiting to see if the Rule is violated or not, rather than determining
from the outset that a possibility exists that an interest will not vest within the time required
by the Rule, see, e.g., Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Curtis, 98 N.H. 225, 97 A.2d 207 (1953)
(holding that in New Hampshire the Rule is not applied remorselessly, and that when two
possible constructions can be given to a testamentary clause it is possible to wait and see what
events actually happen before deciding on the validity of a gift); PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. tit.
20, § 6104 (Purdon 1975) (stating that "[ulpon the expiration of the period allowed by the
common law rule against perpetuities as measured by actual rather than possible events, any
interest not then vested ... shall be void"); and
c. "cy pres"--allowing the court to reform the gift and bring it into conformity with the
rule so that the testator's wishes can be accomplished as far as possible, see, e.g., In re Estate
of Foster, 190 Kan. 498, 376 P.2d 784 (1963) (affirming a lower court order to strike a provision
of testarix' will so that it would not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities); Edgerly v. Barker,
66 N.H. 434, 31 A. 900 (1891) (changing the time of vesting of remainder interest to fall within
the time period of the Rule Against Perpetuities).
305. See, e.g., Newcomb v. City of Newport Beach, 7 Cal. 2d 393, 60 P.2d 825 (1936)
(holding that the Torrens registration system could not be used to defeat the state's interest in
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these long held equity notice principles. Especially in regard to the Law of
Property Act and the Land Registration Act, the dilemma of how much to
dilute the register by introducing notice concerns has become more intense
as recent changes in societal views on the status of women has crept into
policy debates on registered land.3°0 The question of rights in the matrimonial
home, and especially the right of one spouse to dispose of or mortgage a
home without the consent or knowledge of the other spouse, has become a
matter of national importance.307
Distinguished British scholars have dealt at length with the emerging prob-
lem of the marital home as it relates to registration. 08 The debate seems to
be a part of a broader national concern. Currently, political leaders in Britain
often speak of the "caring society." The question is asked whether a given
law, politician, or political party is "caring" in its approach to social issues, 3°9
Some who treat the subject of the matrimonial, or even "cohabitational,"
home in the context of registered land, frame their positions in terms of
this inquiry. 10 Those who push for a more secure title system are portrayed
as representing both selfish "commercial" property interests and the con-
veyancer's obsessive preoccupation with certainty at the expense of the higher
societal goals."' The secure title advocates are presented as "uncaring" in
their narrow protective concerns. Little regard is expressed for the notion
that whatever the merits of spousal rights, it would seem that spouses have
at least as much interest in secure title as anyone else.
Better means exist to address this valid concern than tampering with and
substantially weakening the registration system. Interestingly, one proposal
as an alternative to the overriding rights in registered land approach is a
suggestion that matrimonial homes be treated always in substantive law as
some form of community property. 12 The property would be regarded as
a public easement involving tidelands without serving notice on the state of the plaintiff's action
to quiet title); Moakley v. Los Angeles Pac. Ry. Co., 99 Cal. App. 74, 277 P. 883 (1929)
(deciding that notice must be given to private parties who have an interest in land when another
party seeks to quiet title and to register title); Dewey v. Kimball, 89 Minn. 454, 461, 95 N.W.
317, 320 (1903) (stating that under the Torrens law a title examiner is duty-bound "to search
the records and investigate all the facts brought to his notice," and that "any party whom the
examiner finds to have ... an interest" in the property must be named as a defendant in a
suit to confirm title and registration of the property).
306. See K. GRAY & P. Syims, supra note 12, at 562-63 (discussing, inter alia, the Law
Commission's proposal for compulsory co-ownership of the matrimonial home).
307. See J. RmDALL, supra note 7, at 456.
308. See supra note 12; Hayton, Are Occupiers' Overreachable Interests Really Overriding?,
136 NEw. L.J. 208 (1986); Luxton, Clandestine Co-Owners: An Occupational Hazard for
Mortgages?, 136 NEw. L.J. 771 (1986).
309. See Shlaes, Britain's Alliance Is Offering a Not-So New Deal, Wall St. J., Mar. 18,
1987, at 25, col. 2.
310. See Lords Give Wives' Interest Priority, London Times, June 20, 1980, at 5, col. 1.
311. Id.
312. See K. GRAY & P. Sy),ms, supra note 12, at 562-63.
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owned by both spouses so that any purchaser is always bound to consider
the claims of the spouse as a matter of course. This route seems to suggest
a return to something looking like tenancy by the entirety, long abolished
in England." 3 Despite our headlong rush from some of their efforts, not all
of our ancestors were fools, and perhaps we can still learn from them.
C. Overcoming Obstacles to the New System
One of the major obstacles to the new system will be the expense of
putting it into place. This is especially true if the initial registration must
take place in the form of a full scale judicial procedure. To this concern
the author submits several responses.
First, much of the expense of a registration procedure is duplicated by
any title search, and although the burden will fall on different parties in
the chain, the ultimate expense relating to any single title will be much
reduced because of the ease of subsequent transfers. An argument can thus
be mounted that the ultimate governmental savings in extravagant recordation
arrangements can justify a shift of all or a proportion of the burden on
public expense. Second, if the proposed registration alternative were com-
bined with concurrent reform of the substantive property law of legal and
concurrent estates in the English fashion, a far smaller volume of transactions
would occur with which a register would have to cope. Finally, contemporary
constitutional law 14 may well allow for a registration procedure of an ad-
ministrative nature rather than a full blown judicial proceeding. This seems
especially likely if provisions are made for adequate and full financial com-
pensation to those injured by the process.
One of the most important lessons to be learned from the English expe-
rience is that overly-generous exemption of interests from registration, or a
progressive dilution of a good system to meet current related social issues,
can be the undoing of the entire effort." 5 Caunce,1 6 Bull,317 Boland,315 and
Peffer319 all deal with "fairness" issues. But fairness must concentrate on
the compensation scheme, not on rectification or dilution of the register
through "overriding interests." Such a frailty killed the earlier "Torrens"
313. See Law of Property Act, ch. 20, sched. I, part VI.
314. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, para. 49, 62-64, 66-69 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986) (allowing
the Registrar to appoint attorneys as title examiners, setting forth the administrative procedures,
and allowing the court to override the examiner's decision); MrNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 508A.01 to
.85 (West 1987) (providing for registration of land titles without court proceedings when titles
are uncontested).
315. See Thompson, supra note 149, at 302.
316. Caunce, [1969] 1 W.L.R. 286.
317. Bull, [1955] 1 Q.B. 234.
318. Boland, [1980] 3 W.L.R. 138.
319. Peffer, [1977] 1 W.L.R. 285.
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efforts. The American reform effort must not be taken over by the kind of
response made towards spouses who lacked knowledge about their right to
register, nor by the fear that if this group were to have that knowledge and
were to exercise their right to register, it would overwhelm the system. A
financial arrangement must be provided to properly compensate those who,
in hard cases, are denied the realty through operation of the register. To
modify the register to meet these cases is to deny it that remorseless character
it must have to function efficiently.
CONCLUSION
Radical change in law is never easy. This is a factor for stability. But
when the procedures, techniques, and substance of an important portion of
the law come to serve the needs of those who administer it at the expense
of those for whom it is designed to serve, it is time for a change. Americans
are fortunate to have a comprehensive, well thought out and well-tried scheme
for a better way in the English land law legislation. Granted, Americans are
in a vastly different situation. The whole of England and Wales are scarcely
bigger than the state of Georgia, our twenty-first state in size, yet together,
England and Wales are peopled with some fifty million. We are a nation
close to 240 million inhabiting a continent. For centuries, the English have
relied on the services of a small, highly proficient group of solicitors who
are experts in the field of conveyancing. They enjoy a high level of profes-
sional competence along with those skilled bureaucrats who run the register
and who are in fact creating a kind of informal common law about how
the register should be conducted. Finally, the English have a long tradition
of acquiescence to central authority in London.
This very European trait of centralism, in contrast to the American federal
system, permits a high level of concentration of resources and methods
without particular regard to local political sensibilities which are especially
evident when realty is involved. Nevertheless, the English system is one from
which we can learn much in the long overdue reform of our land law.
Former Chief Justice Burger has said:
[T]he basic system of real estate titles and transfers and the related
matters concerning financing and purchase of homes, cry out for re
examination [sic] and simplification .... I believe that if American law-
yers put their ingenuity and inventiveness to work [on this subject,] they
will be able to devise simpler methods than we now have.31'
He is right. It is time for such reform.
320. Burger, Opening Remarks by The Honorable Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice of the
United States, 51 A.L.I. PROC. 27, 33 (1974).
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